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In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream ￿rms￿ability to
sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net e⁄ect of vertical integration
is to facilitate collusion. Several e⁄ects arise. When upstream o⁄ers are secret, vertical
mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets e⁄ect: Cheating uninte-
grated ￿rms can no longer pro￿tably sell to the downstream a¢ liates of their integrated
rivals. Vertical integration also facilitates collusion through a reaction e⁄ect: the verti-
cally integrated ￿rm￿ s ￿ contract￿with its downstream a¢ liate can be more ￿ exible and thus
allows a swifter reaction in punishing defectors. O⁄setting these two e⁄ects is a possible
punishment e⁄ect which arises if the integrated structure is able to make more pro￿ts in
the punishment phase than a disintegrated structure.
Keywords: vertical mergers, collusion
JEL: L13, L42
1 Introduction
Many famous cases of collusion documented in the literature have involved intermediate goods
industries. Further, a signi￿cant fraction of those cases have involved industries where one or
more ￿rms are vertically integrated.1 Yet existing theories of collusion deal only with collusion
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1See for example Tosdal￿ s (1917) description of vertical mergers in the early twentieth century German Steel
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1between ￿rms selling to consumers (or atomistic buyers). In this paper, we provide the ￿rst
examination of the often more relevant case where colluding ￿rms sell to downstream ￿rms
which are strategic buyers with interdependent demands. Our particular focus is on the e⁄ect
of vertical integration on the possibility of collusion in such markets. Why is vertical integration
such a common feature of collusive industries? Does vertical integration facilitate upstream
collusion, and if so, when should it be a concern for anti-trust regulators?
Following the Chicago School revolution of anti-trust policy in the early 1980s, vertical
restraints were considered to be e¢ ciency-enhancing. In the last decade, however, regulators
and anti-trust authorities have shown an increased interest in prosecuting cases with vertical
aspects (see, e.g., Kwoka and White (1999, part 3), Riordan and Salop (1995), Klass and
Salinger, (1995)). At the same time, academics have been giving increased attention to the
potential anti-competitive e⁄ects of vertical restraints and the nascent literature in this area
has expanded considerably in recent years.2 But this literature has ￿ until now ￿ taken a
strictly static view of the interaction between ￿rms. In contrast, we investigate the impact of
vertical mergers in a dynamic game of repeated interaction between upstream and downstream
￿rms.
In our model, upstream ￿rms produce a homogeneous intermediate good that they sell to
downstream ￿rms. We allow downstream competition in the retail market to be in either prices
or quantities. Contract o⁄ers to downstream ￿rms may either be public and observed by all
parties, or else secret and observed only by the contracting parties. In this set-up, we identify
four ways in which a vertical merger a⁄ects upstream ￿rms￿incentives to collude.
First, and perhaps most importantly, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the op-
eration of an outlets e⁄ect. Cheating unintegrated ￿rms can no longer pro￿tably sell to the
downstream a¢ liates of their integrated rivals, and foreclosure from these outlets makes defec-
tion from the collusive agreement less pro￿table. Second, vertical integration also facilitates
collusion through a reaction e⁄ect: the vertically integrated ￿rm￿ s ￿ contract￿with its down-
stream a¢ liate can be more ￿ exible and thus allows a swifter reaction in punishing defectors.
Third, and related to the reaction e⁄ect, is the lack-of-commitment e⁄ect. This again arises
because of the ￿ exibility of the integrated ￿rm￿ s relation with its downstream a¢ liate. The
integrated ￿rm cannot commit not to follow up deviating o⁄ers to other downstream ￿rms
with a best response through its own downstream division; and this can limit the pro￿ts it
is able to extract in making deviant o⁄ers. Fourth, and working against the three previous
e⁄ects is the punishment e⁄ect. This e⁄ect arises only if the integrated structure is able to
make more pro￿ts in the punishment phase than a disintegrated structure. This increased rent
in the punishment phase makes the integrated ￿rm more tempted to deviate.
Table 1 illustrates which of these e⁄ects are at work in each of the four particular models
that we study. We show that in each case, the net e⁄ect of vertical integration is to facilitate
upstream collusion.
In the United States, policy makers￿stance toward vertical restraints was laid out in the
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984). In contrast to the academic literature, the Guide-
2See for example, the recent contributions by Chen (2001), Choi and Yi (2001), Riordan (1998), Chen and
Riordan (2003) and Rey and Tirole (2003) for a survey.
2Table 1: The collusive e⁄ects of vertical integration.
Public o⁄ers Secret o⁄ers
Bertrand Outlets e⁄ect
competition Reaction e⁄ect Lack-of-commitment e⁄ect
Outlets e⁄ect Outlets e⁄ect
Cournot Reaction e⁄ect Lack-of-commitment e⁄ect
competition Punishment e⁄ect Punishment e⁄ect
lines already anticipate the idea that vertical mergers may facilitate collusion,3 envisaging two
ways in which this may occur. Firstly, it may be that vertical merger facilitates upstream col-
lusion by making it somehow easier to monitor prices. This is an old idea which has yet to be
properly formalized,4 but which has some relation to the theory proposed in this paper. Here,
however, we do not impose any ad hoc changes in the ability to observe or punish deviations,
but rather consider di⁄erences in contracts and incentives to cheat on a collusive agreement
which arise endogenously as a result of vertical integration. Vertical integration clearly cannot
improve the observability of prices when all contract o⁄ers are completely public, as in our
base model. But the observability of defections from the collusive agreement is relevant only if
￿rms can react to them, and vertical integration does enhance the integrated ￿rm￿ s ability to
react to observed defections, so vertical integration facilitates collusion.5
The second way in which the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines envisage that vertical
integration may facilitate collusion is through the acquisition of a ￿disruptive buyer￿ . The
Guidelines state that a disruptive buyer is one which is substantially di⁄erent from the others,
the idea being that price-cutting to this buyer is particularly attractive, so that the ￿removal￿
of this buyer from the downstream market may signi￿cantly reduce incentives to cheat on a
collusive agreement. Again, this idea has some relation to our theory, but we derive, rather
than impose, the result that the purchase of a downstream buyer by an upstream ￿rm makes
it less attractive for its rivals to cheat by removing an outlet for their cheating (our ￿ outlets￿
3Interestingly, the Guidelines, like our paper, are concerned entirely with the e⁄ects on upstream collusion.
4But see Jullien and Rey (2001) for the related idea that resale price maintenance may facilitate collusion
in an agency model where retailers face demand shocks which are not observed by wholesalers. In their model,
resale price maintenance acts to smooth downstream prices which can make cheating easier to detect.
5Further, the reaction e⁄ect may in principle still arise even when contract o⁄ers are made secretly. We show
that it is possible to design the collusive scheme so that some deviations will be detected and reacted to before
they are revealed in the market price for the downstream output. Unintegrated ￿rms will not make deviant
o⁄ers to the integrated ￿rm as this would allow the latter immediately to detect cheating. Deviant o⁄ers to
unintegrated downstream ￿rms also become more di¢ cult if these ￿rms are normally supplied by the integrated
￿rm, because the integrated ￿rm can detect such cheating if its downstream customers are led to reject contracts
which they would normally accept.
3e⁄ect). Our analysis suggests that the Guidelines may be too restrictive in focusing on buyers
which ￿ di⁄er substantially￿from other ￿rms in its market: even when downstream ￿rms are
symmetric, the removal of a downstream buyer can improve collusion possibilities. Moreover,
it is not obvious that the acquisition of a particularly attractive buyer will facilitate upstream
collusion. For the acquiring upstream ￿rm it is a double-edged sword since it now owns an
attractive outlet for cheating, so its own incentive to cheat may increase (in our model this
shows up as the punishment e⁄ect). Nevertheless we show that integration with a low-cost or
large downstream ￿rm most facilitates collusion in our model of public o⁄ers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we set out a model of repeated compe-
tition between upstream ￿rms to supply an input to downstream ￿rms, where o⁄ers made to
downstream ￿rms are public information. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis for both
Bertrand and Cournot competition downstream, demonstrating that vertical merger facilitates
collusion in these models. Section 4 compares our results with the policy laid down in the
U.S. Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and examines the idea they outline of a ￿ disruptive
buyer￿by introducing asymmetries downstream and investigating which vertical mergers are
most damaging to competitive conduct. In section 5 we turn to an investigation of how the
analysis is changed if upstream ￿rms￿o⁄ers are secret. In section 6 we investigate to what ex-
tent other vertical restraints can substitute for vertical merger in facilitating collusion. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model with Public O⁄ers
M identical upstream ￿rms, U1; U2;:::; UM produce a homogeneous intermediate good at
constant and identical constant marginal cost c, which for simplicity we set equal to 0. They
sell this good to N symmetric downstream ￿rms (or retailers), D1; D2;:::; DN. Downstream
￿rms transform intermediate inputs into a homogeneous ￿nal output on a one-to-one basis at
zero marginal costs of production. For simplicity, we assume that N ￿ M ￿ 2. (If N = 1 or
M = 1, the monopoly outcome could trivially be achieved.)
The M upstream ￿rms make simultaneous and public take-it-or-leave-it two-part tari⁄
o⁄ers to the downstream ￿rms. Ui￿ s o⁄er to Dj takes the form ￿ij ￿ (wij;Fij), where wij is
the marginal wholesale price and Fij is the ￿xed fee. The ￿xed fee Fij has to be paid when
the o⁄er is accepted, while the wholesale price wij has to be paid for each unit that is ordered
and then sold in the retail market to consumers. If Ui does not make an o⁄er to Dj, then
￿ij = ?. In the retail market, the N downstream ￿rms compete either in prices or quantities.
That is, Dj sets its retail price pj (under price competition) or its quantity qj (under quantity
competition).
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Firms have an in￿nite horizon, and maximize the
discounted sum of their future pro￿ts, using the common discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1). Vertically
integrated ￿rms are assumed to maximize their joint pro￿ts, independently of any ￿transfer
prices￿ between the upstream and downstream a¢ liate. As pointed out by Bonanno and
Vickers (1988), this implies that the vertically integrated downstream ￿rm￿ s true wholesale
price is the marginal cost of its upstream a¢ liate, c.
4Each period, an identical set of consumers come to the downstream market to buy the ￿nal
good. We write Q(￿) and P(￿) for the market demand and inverse market demand functions,
respectively.
The timing in each period is as follows:
1. O⁄er stage: Upstream ￿rms U1;:::;UM simultaneously make public o⁄ers to the down-
stream ￿rms.
2. Acceptance stage: Downstream ￿rms D1;:::;DN simultaneously decide which contract(s)
to accept.6 If they decide to accept a contract, the relevant ￿xed fee is paid to the
upstream ￿rm. Dj￿ s decision vis-￿-vis Ui￿ s o⁄er is denoted by ￿ji 2 faccept;rejectg.
3. Output stage: Downstream ￿rms D1;:::;DN simultaneously set prices or quantities in
the downstream (retail) market. Quantities demanded by consumers are then ordered
from the upstream ￿rms at the relevant wholesale prices.
The game is one of public information: all past actions become common knowledge at the
end of each stage.
We seek the most collusive subgame perfect equilibrium that gives all monopoly rents to the
upstream ￿rms. For simplicity we assume that upstream ￿rms sustain collusion through in￿nite
Nash reversion (see the classic analysis of Friedman (1971) and the papers which followed it)
and moreover that such Nash reversion will be triggered by any deviation by an upstream ￿rm.
In contrast, deviations by downstream ￿rms (which get no rents in the collusive equilibrium)
do not trigger any punishment. Unfortunately the analysis of optimal punishment schemes
turns out to be a complex undertaking in our set-up, and is outside the scope of this paper.
Optimal punishment strategies in oligopolies are explored in Abreu (1986) (see also the more
general analysis in Abreu (1988)), but unfortunately, the results of these papers do not apply
in our set-up for several reasons. In particular, the optimal punishment literature assumes that
oligopolists sell directly to (atomistic, myopic) consumers. Whereas in our model, upstream
oligopolists sell to downstream ￿rms, which could potentially be involved in enforcing the
collusive scheme. The optimal design of collusive schemes where e⁄ective deviation requires
the agreement of two parties (a downstream ￿rm must accept the upstream ￿rm￿ s deviant o⁄er)
is an important and interesting topic which we hope to address in future research.
In common with the majority of the non-cooperative collusion literature, we do not allow for
direct side payments between upstream ￿rms, on the grounds that these will invite scrutiny by
anti-trust authorities. We will say that vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion if it
reduces the critical discount factor above which the most collusive equilibrium can be sustained.
Throughout the paper, we will denote by QM; pM, and ￿M the joint-pro￿t maximizing industry
output, retail price, and industry pro￿t, respectively.
6Downstream ￿rms are allowed to accept more than one o⁄er, i.e., contracts are non-exclusive.
53 Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis of Bertrand and Cournot competition downstream,
which will allow us to set out in more detail the outlets, reaction, and punishments e⁄ects of
vertical integration. In the following, we compare two market structures: non-integration (NI),
where no upstream ￿rm is vertically integrated, and single integration (SI), where a single
upstream ￿rm and a single downstream ￿rm are vertically integrated. Before doing so, let us
consider the properties of the noncollusive equilibrium.
Noncollusive Equilibrium. In the following, we will refer to the static subgame perfect
equilibrium of the stage game as the noncollusive equilibrium of the game. We assume that
the punishment phase of the collusive equilibrium involves in￿nitely repeated play of this static
equilibrium. Independently of market structure, and independently of whether downstream
competition is in prices or quantities, any noncollusive (static) equilibrium must have the
following two properties: (i) each upstream ￿rm makes zero pro￿t (on sales to unintegrated
downstream ￿rms), and (ii) each o⁄er to an (unintegrated) downstream ￿rm (that is accepted
in equilibrium) maximizes the bilateral rents, given the set of other o⁄ers that are accepted
in equilibrium. To see (i), suppose otherwise that Uj makes a positive pro￿t on a particular
contract in the noncollusive equilibrium. Then, its upstream rival Ui could pro￿tably deviate by
o⁄ering the same contract but with a slightly lower ￿xed fee. This would not a⁄ect downstream
competition (as wholesale prices are unchanged), and so clearly the deviant contract would be
accepted. Hence, no upstream ￿rm can make a positive pro￿t in any noncollusive equilibrium.
To see (ii), suppose otherwise that Uj￿ s o⁄er to Di does not maximize the bilateral rents of the
pair Uj ￿ Di. Then, another (unintegrated) upstream ￿rm, say Dk, can pro￿tably deviate by
o⁄ering a contract to Di that is more attractive to Di than Uj￿ s o⁄er and that leaves some rent
to Dk. Since Dk does not receive any rents from any other contract (see (i)), any externalities
that this new contract may exert will not a⁄ect the pro￿tability of Uj￿ s contracts with other
￿rms.
3.1 Bertrand Competition
Suppose ￿rst that downstream ￿rms compete in prices.
Noncollusive Equilibrium. Under both non-integration and single integration, upstream
￿rms make two-part tari⁄o⁄ers of the form (wij;Fij) = (0;0) to the (unintegrated) downstream
￿rms. Consequently, all downstream ￿rms set a retail price of 0, and industry pro￿ts are zero.
Non-Integration. Consider the market structure where no ￿rm is vertically integrated. The
collusive equilibrium o⁄ers are of the form (wij;Fij) = (pM;0), which allow the upstream ￿rms
to obtain monopoly rents. Since upstream ￿rms are symmetric, the optimal collusive scheme
involves sharing the market equally. That is, each upstream ￿rm obtains a per-period pro￿t
of ￿M=M along the (collusive) equilibrium path. If an upstream ￿rm wants to deviate from
the collusive scheme, it may o⁄er the contract (0;￿M ￿ ") to a single downstream ￿rm, or
contracts of the form (pM ￿ ";￿") to any subset of downstream ￿rms, for arbitrarily small ".
By optimally deviating, an upstream ￿rm can thus obtain (almost) the monopoly pro￿t ￿M.
Following any deviation, all ￿rms revert forever to the noncollusive equilibrium, which yields
6zero industry pro￿ts.









Single Integration. Consider now the market structure where one ￿rm (U1, say) is vertically
integrated (with D1, say). Along the collusive equilibrium path, each upstream ￿rm makes
contract o⁄ers of the form (pM;0) to each (unintegrated) downstream ￿rm, who then set a
retail price of pM. This is exactly as under non-integration. As will become clear, minimizing
the critical discount factor requires giving a larger market share, which we denote by ￿, to the
integrated ￿rm, while the remaining share of the market is divided equally between the M ￿1
unintegrated upstream ￿rms.
By simply undercutting the M ￿1 unintegrated downstream ￿rms in the retail market, the
integrated ￿rm can obtain the monopoly pro￿t if it decides to cheat. The ensuing punishment
phase then entails zero pro￿t even for the integrated ￿rm: there is no punishment e⁄ect. Hence,




Comparing (1) and (2), we see that, for a given market share of ￿ = 1=M, vertical integration
does not a⁄ect the integrated ￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate. This is due to the absence of the
punishment e⁄ect.
Let us now consider an unintegrated upstream ￿rm￿ s (U2￿ s, say) incentive to deviate. If the
integrated ￿rm U1 ￿ D1 were unable to react to a deviation (and were forced to continue to
charge the monopoly price pM), then U2 could simply o⁄er contracts of the form (wij;Fij) =
(pM ￿ ";￿") to the unintegrated downstream ￿rms D2, :::;DN for arbitrarily small " > 0.
Clearly, all unintegrated downstream ￿rms would accept these deviant o⁄ers, and U2 could
obtain a pro￿t arbitrarily close to the monopoly pro￿t. Since U2 could thus still obtain the
monopoly pro￿t if U1 ￿ D1 were unable to react to U2￿ s deviation, there is no outlets e⁄ect.
However, since o⁄ers are public, the integrated downstream ￿rm D1 can react to U2￿ s deviation.
In particular, since D1 has marginal cost of c = 0, it can simply undercut any price pj > 0
set by downstream ￿rms Dj, j = 2;:::;N. It follows that Dj cannot make any pro￿ts from
accepting a deviant o⁄er, and so neither can the deviant unintegrated upstream ￿rm U2. This
constitutes an extremely strong reaction e⁄ect.
In our discussion, we have implicitly assumed that U2 will not ￿nd it pro￿table to sell
through the integrated downstream ￿rm D1. But this is indeed the case since if the integrated
￿rm U1 ￿ D1 does not want to deviate on its own account (i.e., if (2) holds), it certainly will
not wish to accept a (pro￿table to U2) deviating o⁄er from its rival which splits the pro￿ts
from deviation. If collusion is going to break down, the integrated ￿rm is always at least weakly
better o⁄ doing this by making a deviant move of its own at the output stage. This is the
7operation of the outlets e⁄ect. In the pathological case of homogeneous Bertrand competition,
the outlets e⁄ect has no bite for the unintegrated ￿rm since if it were not for the reaction e⁄ect
it could obtain the whole monopoly pro￿t without needing to sell through the integrated ￿rm.
This is obviously not the case in general, however, or indeed, as we will see, in the Cournot
model we study below.
It follows from these observations that an unintegrated upstream ￿rm in this environment
cannot pro￿t from cheating; it will be willing to collude as long as:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
(M ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 0: (3)
Clearly, this inequality is satis￿ed for any market share allocation ￿. From the no-cheating
constraint of the integrated ￿rm, (2), the critical discount factor under single integration is thus
given by b ￿
SI
= 1 ￿ ￿. Hence, single integration facilitates upstream collusion for any market
share allocation ￿ > 1=M. In fact, by choosing ￿ arbitrarily close to 1, the critical discount
factor above which collusion can be sustained under (single) vertical integration can be made
arbitrarily small. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 1 If downstream ￿rms compete in prices, vertical integration facilitates upstream
collusion.
In the case of Bertrand competition, the collusive e⁄ect of vertical integration relies solely on
the reaction e⁄ect. Under public o⁄ers, ￿rms can immediately observe any deviation from the
expected collusive contracts. However, upstream ￿rms￿ability to punish observed deviations
is limited because they have already posted their take-it-or-leave-it contract o⁄ers, and are
committed to these. Nevertheless, an integrated ￿rm can react in this way because it does
not need an in￿ exible contract to ensure that its downstream a¢ liate toes the collusive line.
This is why vertical integration is helpful in maintaining collusion here - because the integrated
￿rm has more ￿ exibility to react. E⁄ectively, through integration, U1 has recruited D1 as an
￿ enforcer￿of the upstream collusive agreement.
Remark: Whilst the Bertrand homogeneous goods case is extreme, in that a single vertical
merger allows perfect collusion, it illustrates the more general point that (provided the initial
number of upstream ￿rms is larger than two), a vertical merger can easily be more collusive
than a horizontal merger between two upstream ￿rms. This is in contrast to what seems to
be widely believed and underlines the importance of studying the collusive impact of vertical
mergers.
3.2 Cournot Competition
Noncollusive Equilibrium. In contrast to the case of Bertrand competition, downstream ￿rms
now obtain rents in the noncollusive equilibrium. Independently of the market structure,
the noncollusive equilibrium involves two-part tari⁄s of the form (wij;Fij) = (0;0) to each
(unintegrated) downstream ￿rm. Each of the N downstream ￿rms obtains a pro￿t of ￿C(N),
which is 1=Nth of the N-￿rm Cournot industry pro￿t.
8Non-Integration. Suppose no ￿rm is vertically integrated. In the collusive equilibrium, the
wholesale price is set such that the total Cournot output of all active downstream ￿rms with this
input cost would be exactly the monopoly output of a structure facing the true marginal cost.
Speci￿cally, suppose Dj produces a quantity of qj = ￿jQM, 0 ￿ ￿j ￿ 1, along the collusive
equilibrium path, the input for which it purchases from Ui. Then, the marginal wholesale price
is wij = P(QM)+￿jQMP0(QM) and the ￿xed fee is Fij = [pM ￿wij]qj = ￿q2
jP0(QM) = ￿2
j￿M.
To equate the incentives to deviate for all upstream ￿rms, each upstream ￿rm should optimally
receive, in each period, 1=Mth of the monopoly pro￿t along the collusive equilibrium path. If
an upstream ￿rm wants to deviate, it can do so by slightly reducing the ￿xed fee, leaving
unchanged the wholesale price. It is a dominant strategy for each downstream ￿rm to accept
such a deviant o⁄er. Consequently, the deviant upstream can obtain the monopoly pro￿t in
the period of deviation. In the ensuing punishment phase, upstream ￿rms do not obtain any
rents. The no-cheating constraint under non-integration is thus given by:
￿M
M (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿M: (4)
Note that this constraint is the same as under Bertrand competition, and so the critical discount
factor is again given by b ￿
NI
= (M ￿ 1)=M.
Single Integration. Suppose now that one ￿rm (U1, say) is vertically integrated (with D1,
say). The collusive equilibrium o⁄ers to unintegrated downstream ￿rms take the same form as
under non-integration. We again denote the market share of the integrated ￿rm by ￿, while
the remaining market share is divided equally between the M ￿1 unintegrated upstream ￿rms.
Consider ￿rst the incentives to cheat for the integrated pair U1 ￿ D1. We claim that the
integrated pair can still make the monopoly pro￿t in the period of deviation in the following
way. U1 should o⁄er contracts with a wholesale price of pM or above to all of the unintegrated
downstream ￿rms, as well as a slightly negative (but arbitrarily small) ￿xed fee, ￿", to induce
them to accept these o⁄ers. Because of our assumption that any deviation by an upstream
￿rm will lead to Nash reversion, this action signals to the unintegrated downstream ￿rms that
there will be a punishment phase from next period onward. At the output stage (following
U1￿ s deviant o⁄ers and the downstream ￿rms￿acceptance decisions) the downstream ￿rms will
therefore produce the static Nash equilibrium quantities, given the downstream ￿rms￿wholesale
prices (since there will be punishment next period regardless of what ￿rms do at the output
stage). If one or more of the unintegrated downstream ￿rms were to accept not only the deviant
o⁄er but also their equilibrium contracts , then in the induced subgame the industry equilibrium
output would be larger than the monopoly quantity. Since the equilibrium o⁄ers are such that
each unintegrated downstream ￿rm makes zero pro￿t when industry output is QM, it follows
that each would now make a loss if it were to accept its equilibrium contract.7 Hence, following
7Let Q
0 denote industry output in the subgame where (after observing U1￿ s deviation) one or more down-
stream ￿rms accept their equilibrium contracts. Clearly, Q
0 > Q
M. We claim that if downstream ￿rm Dj, j 6= 1,
were to accept its equilibrium contract after U1￿ s deviation, its pro￿t gross of the ￿xed fee would be lower than
along the collusive equilibrium path. Since its equilibrium net pro￿t is just zero, it would thus make an overall
loss if it decided to accept its equilibrium contract following U1￿ s deviation.
From the ￿rst-order condition of pro￿t maximization, the pro￿t (gross of the ￿xed fee) of a downstream ￿rm
9U1￿ s deviation, all unintegrated downstream ￿rms will reject their equilibrium contracts and
produce nothing, while D1 will produce the monopoly output. Thus the integrated pair can
achieve ￿M in the period of deviation, the same pro￿t as can be achieved by an unintegrated
￿rm if no ￿rm is integrated.8
In the ensuing punishment phase, which involves in￿nite reversion to the noncollusive equi-
librium, U1 ￿ D1 obtains a per-period pro￿t of ￿C(N), the pro￿t of a ￿rm in Cournot com-








The last term on the right-hand side represents the punishment e⁄ect of vertical integration.
Consider now an unintegrated upstream ￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate (U2￿ s, say). Let ￿dev
un
denote the maximum pro￿t U2 can get in the period of deviation; we discuss this term in detail
below. Following any deviation, ￿rms will revert forever to the noncollusive equilibrium, which
gives zero pro￿t to any (unintegrated) upstream ￿rm. Hence, the no-cheating constraint for an
unintegrated upstream ￿rm can be written as
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
(M ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿dev
un : (6)
The most ￿ aggressive￿deviation for U2 would consist in o⁄ering to all N ￿ 1 unintegrated
downstream ￿rms contracts of the form (wij;Fij) = (0;￿C(N)￿"), where " > 0 can be chosen
to be arbitrarily small. However, U2 may do weakly better by increasing its wholesale prices
and adjusting its ￿xed fees accordingly so as to extract (almost) all of the downstream rents (or
by reducing the number of downstream ￿rms to which it sells when deviating). This induces
softer behavior from the unintegrated downstream ￿rms (but more aggressive behavior from the
integrated downstream ￿rm D1). If the number of downstream ￿rms N is su¢ ciently large, this
will allow U2 to extract more downstream rents. (This intuition is closely related to the result













00(Q)[P(Q) ￿ w] > 0:









where q denotes the ￿rm￿ s own output. The term in curly brackets must be negative for q to be pro￿t-maximizing
(this is just the second-order condition), and so the inequality holds. We thus have ￿(wjQ
0) < ￿(wjQ
M).
8It might seem that U1 could also achieve a deviation pro￿t of ￿
M in the same way as in the unintegrated case:
by simply undercutting his rivals￿o⁄ers to D2;:::DN. In fact this is not the case due to a lack-of-commitment
e⁄ect - as explained in the text, the integrated U1 ￿ D1 cannot commit not to best-respond to his own deviant
o⁄er. Since the lack-of-commitment e⁄ect does not a⁄ect pro￿ts here, we postpone discussion of it until section
5.
10that a horizontal merger between a subset of ￿rms that does not induce an e¢ ciency gain leads
to higher pro￿ts for the nonparticipating outsiders; see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983.)
This softer behavior imposes a positive externality on the integrated ￿rm, and so U1 ￿ D1￿ s
pro￿t in the period of U2￿ s deviation must be greater than or equal to ￿C(N). Consequently,
￿C(N) + ￿dev
un is less than the industry pro￿t when U2 deviates, which in turn is clearly less
than the monopoly pro￿t. Hence, we must have ￿C(N) + ￿dev
un < ￿M.
Assuming that the market share allocation ￿ is chosen optimally to minimize the critical
discount factor (see Compte et al. 2001), we can ￿nd the critical discount factor by adding up
the incentive constraint of the integrated ￿rm, (5), and the M ￿ 1 incentive constraints of the










Comparing this critical discount factor with that under non-integration, we ￿nd that (single)
integration facilitates upstream collusion if and only if ￿C(N)+￿dev
un < ￿M. As we have shown




. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 2 If downstream ￿rms compete in quantities, vertical integration facilitates up-
stream collusion.
In contrast to the case of Bertrand competition downstream, not only the reaction e⁄ect but
also the outlets and punishment e⁄ects of vertical integration are at work here. The integrated
￿rm sells ￿QM along the equilibrium path and since a deviating unintegrated upstream ￿rm
cannot pro￿tably sell through the integrated downstream ￿rm, it cannot obtain the monopoly
pro￿t on deviating. This is the outlets e⁄ect. In addition, the integrated ￿rm can react to
the unintegrated ￿rm￿ s deviation by further increasing its output. This is the reaction e⁄ect.
Both the outlets and reaction e⁄ects reduce the incentives to cheat for unintegrated upstream
￿rms. On the other hand, for a given market share ￿, the punishment e⁄ect increases the
integrated ￿rm￿ s incentives to cheat on the collusive agreement. However, as the proposition
shows, the outlets and reaction e⁄ects jointly outweigh the punishment e⁄ect, so that (single)
vertical integration makes upstream collusion easier to sustain.
Notice further that in proving the above result we have not made strong use of the fact
that the downstream ￿rms are in homogeneous goods Cournot competition. We have made use
of the Cournot assumption only to write the integrated ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in the punishment phase,
￿NC
int , by ￿C, but this was relatively incidental to the main thrust of the argument. This leads
us to conjecture that the result that the punishment e⁄ect is outweighed by the other e⁄ects
holds as long as ￿NC
int +￿dev
un < ￿M, which the above line of reasoning indicates may hold more
generally than only in the particular models presented here. (The further results presented
below are also suggestive of this.) Extending the result to di⁄erentiated goods downstream
introduces some additional features which are somewhat tangential to the main issues we wish
to address here, however, so we leave this topic for further research.9
9When downstream ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated goods, the division of output between downstream ￿rms
11Remark 1: Punishments other than Nash Reversion. Allowing for punishments which are
more severe than Nash reversion will only reduce the value of both ￿NC
int , the pro￿t of the
integrated ￿rm after it has deviated, and ￿dev
un , the pro￿t of the unintegrated ￿rm in the period
in which it deviates and the integrated ￿rm immediately reacts in a Nash fashion. Therefore
we conjecture that allowing for more severe punishment of deviating ￿rms would only make
our results hold more strongly. The analysis of optimal punishment in this environment is,
however, a very complex undertaking which is outside the scope of this paper.
Remark 2: Incentives for Vertical Merger. We have shown that vertical merger makes
upstream collusion easier. This in itself provides upstream ￿rms with a reason to integrate
downstream. However, it should be noted that the optimal collusive arrangement of market
shares (where this is interpreted as the arrangement which minimizes the critical discount factor
below which collusion cannot be sustained, see Compte et al., 2002) typically gives a larger
market share to integrated ￿rms than to unintegrated ones. The reason is that on integration,
a ￿rm￿ s own incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement weakly increases, whereas its
rivals have a reduced incentive to deviate. Consequently it is optimal to give more on the
equilibrium path to the merged ￿rm to equalize deviation incentives. Thus if the collusive
agreement does indeed distribute market shares in order to minimize the critical discount
factor, vertical mergers are not a pure public good for other upstream industry participants.
While acquiring a downstream ￿rm may be costly (in particular if, as in the Cournot model,
downstream ￿rms make positive rents in the noncollusive equilibrium), the acquirer would be
rewarded by a larger market share. A positive analysis of the merger game would require
us to develop a model of the bargaining process through which parties arrive at the collusive
agreement to divide output, and of the merger process itself, and so would take us too far a￿eld
from the normative issues addressed paper, but it is quite conceivable that multiple integrations
could arise.10 It is to this topic that we now turn.
3.3 The Impact of Multiple Integration on Collusion
We have shown above that in a variety of models, vertical integration by a single ￿rm facilitates
collusion relative to the case where no ￿rm is integrated. Do further integrations also facilitate
collusion? As is by now clear, each integration removes an outlet for cheating, thus facilitating
collusion. It also turns a ￿rm with an in￿ exible wholesale contract into one with a ￿ exible
contract. In general, this latter change has both a cost and a bene￿t, though only the bene￿t
shows up in the single integration case. The bene￿t comes in the form of the reaction e⁄ect that
we have already seen: a ￿rm with a ￿ ￿ exible￿wholesale contract can revert to non-cooperative
becomes more important, and this can complicate the design of a perfect collusive scheme. To take one example
of the type of problems that arise, for symmetric di⁄erentiation, perfect collusion requires that downstream
production is split equally between the two downstream ￿rms, which con￿ icts with the need to give a larger
market share to an integrated ￿rm (since downstream ￿rms will not accept more than one o⁄er with a positive
￿xed fee). It may be possible to overcome this problem by having the unitegrated upstream ￿rms supply
subsidized output to the integrated downstream ￿rm, but the analysis is clearly much messier without adding
to the insight described in the text.
10Interestingly, this observation is consistent with the description of cartelized ￿rms￿strategic reasons for ver-
tical mergers in Tosdal (1917), and Levinstein (1997). Both authors suggest that ￿rms used vertical integration
as a bargaining tool to acquire a larger share of the collusive output.
12behavior immediately on observing a deviation, rather than having to wait for an opportunity
to revise its contract. The cost is that a ￿rm with a ￿ exible contract is able to deviate
secretly through its own downstream a¢ liate, whereas when o⁄ers are public an (unintegrated)
￿rm with an in￿ exible contract must deviate publicly. That is, since an integrated upstream
￿rm￿ s posted internal transfer price does not provide any commitment or a⁄ect its downstream
unit￿ s behavior (which is always pro￿t-maximizing with respect to the whole ￿rm), there may
be no public warning in the o⁄er or acceptance stage that the downstream unit intends to
deviate from the collusive path at the output stage. This cost of integration does not arise
on the ￿rst integration because unintegrated ￿rms are anyway unable to react even to public
deviations within a period, so the fact that it becomes possible to conceal one￿ s deviation until
the next period is not relevant. However, once at least one ￿rm is integrated, we have seen that
the reaction e⁄ect makes ￿ within period￿punishment of public deviations possible; whereas
deviations which are made without any alteration in public contracts cannot be punished until
the following period. Thus subsequent integrations may not facilitate collusion to as great an
extent as the ￿rst integration, and, as we discuss in the following, it is di¢ cult to prove general
results.
3.3.1 Bertrand Competition
We have already seen that a single integration in this model can, with appropriate redistribution
of market shares, allow collusion to be sustained even in the static case: b ￿ = 0. Therefore,
further integration clearly cannot improve the prospects for collusion in this model. There is
no further reaction e⁄ect since a single integrated ￿rm is already able to reduce the price to
marginal cost when cheating occurs; there is no outlets e⁄ect since it is not necessary to sell
through more than one downstream ￿rm to achieve monopoly pro￿t; and there is no punishment
e⁄ect since there are no rents in the punishment phase. Nevertheless, further vertical integration
in the industry will actually harm the prospects for collusion for the following reason. Since a
vertically integrated ￿rm always has a transfer price of c whether or not its downstream unit
is planning to collude or cheat in the output stage, vertical integration makes it impossible to
detect and punish cheating within the same period. Whereas cheating by an unintegrated ￿rm
is immediately visible in the wholesale contracts it o⁄ers, it will only be known that a vertically
integrated ￿rm has cheated after the output stage. When at least one ￿rm is integrated, and so
could react to deviations within the same period, this di⁄erence is important. Essentially, the
￿ ip side of the ￿ exibility of pricing associated with the reaction e⁄ect is that it reduces (delays)
the observability of prices. This is interesting since it contrasts strongly with the standard
view (mentioned in the introduction above) that vertical integration facilitates collusion by
increasing the observability of prices.
3.3.2 Cournot Competition
When downstream ￿rms compete in quantities, the optimal collusive scheme involves each
integrated upstream ￿rm selling all of its equilibrium output through its integrated downstream
a¢ liate. This arrangement is designed to minimize the integrated ￿rms￿incentive to deviate
secretly - the incentive to deviate publicly is una⁄ected by the market share arrangement, as
13will become clear shortly. If integrated ￿rms were to make any pro￿ts on sales to unintegrated
downstream ￿rms, these pro￿ts could still be earned in a period of secret deviation, since the
on-the-equilibrium path o⁄ers will already have been accepted and quantities ordered and paid
for before the integrated ￿rm￿ s secret deviation becomes apparent after the output stage. So
any pro￿ts from sales to unintegrated ￿rms simply augment integrated ￿rms￿secret deviation
pro￿ts, and therefore such sales should be set to zero.
Under this collusive scheme, the maximum pro￿t that a secretly deviating integrated ￿rm
can obtain is the Cournot best-reply pro￿t to QM(1￿ ￿
K), the monopoly quantity less what it
was itself supposed to sell through its downstream a¢ liate, where K is the number of integrated
￿rms and ￿ is their total market share. Alternatively, an integrated ￿rm can decide to deviate
publicly by altering its o⁄ers to the unintegrated downstream ￿rms. Public deviation has
both an advantage and a disadvantage compared to private deviation. The advantage is that
when unintegrated downstream ￿rms see that a ￿rm plans to expand its output above the
agreed collusive share, they will refuse their equilibrium contracts since they will be unable
to cover the ￿xed fee. Thus it is actually valuable to ￿ announce￿a deviation to unintegrated
downstream ￿rms making sales on the equilibrium path. The disadvantage comes in the form
of the reaction e⁄ect from the other integrated ￿rms: they can respond to the public deviation
by increasing their output. An integrated ￿rm￿ s public deviation pro￿t is bounded from above
by the pro￿t of a Stackelberg leader with K￿1 followers. (This bound is tight if the number of
downstream ￿rms N is su¢ ciently large.) The deviation pro￿t of an unintegrated ￿rm (which
can only deviate publicly) is given correspondingly by the pro￿t of a Stackelberg leader with
K followers. Thus the pro￿t from a public deviation is clearly decreasing in K.
Evidently, when only one ￿rm is integrated (K = 1), public deviation is strictly preferred
to secret deviation since there are no integrated rivals to react by increasing output and (since
N ￿ M ￿ 2) there is at least one unintegrated downstream ￿rm which will react by decreasing
(to zero) its output. Hence, public deviations are preferable for su¢ ciently small K. Conversely,
for K = M, there are no unintegrated rivals to react and when all ￿rms are integrated each will
prefer to make a private deviation. If integrated ￿rms also prefer to make a private deviation
when only M ￿ 1 ￿rms are integrated, then the Mth and ￿nal integration will make collusion
more di¢ cult for the following reason. There is no outlets e⁄ect to this integration since all
the other upstream ￿rms, if they cheat, will do so only through their downstream a¢ liates;
there is no reaction e⁄ect, since all deviations occur secretly; but, as long as N the number of
downstream ￿rms is ￿nite, the integration will entail a punishment e⁄ect. Thus if the number
of upstream ￿rms M is large enough that private deviation would be optimal if all but one
￿rm is integrated, then full integration of the industry is not optimal for sustaining collusion.
If, however, the number of upstream ￿rms M is su¢ ciently small that even when M ￿ 1 ￿rms
are integrated the preferred deviation is still a public one, then full integration of the industry
can be optimal (especially if N is large so that the punishment e⁄ect is small).11
11Calculations for the Cournot model with linear demand show that this is indeed the case for M = 2 as
N ! 1, for example.
143.3.3 Summary of Multiple Integration
In summary, our results would suggest that although the ￿rst integration always facilitates
collusion, the same may not be said of all subsequent integrations and there is an intuitive sense
in which each successive merger has less collusive bene￿t than the previous ones.12 The resulting
policy advice is thus in contrast to that laid out in the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984,
section 4.221), which suggest that vertical integration is unlikely to facilitate collusion unless a
signi￿cant fraction of the industry is already vertically integrated. We analyze these Guidelines
further in the next section.
4 Asymmetries Downstream: The ￿ Disruptive Buyer￿and Anti-
Trust Policy on Vertical Mergers
The U.S. 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (section 4.22) contain remarks pertaining to
vertical mergers which may facilitate collusion. Although these Guidelines were formulated
on the basis of theory which is now outmoded,13 they nonetheless provide a useful point of
comparison for our theory.14 As in our analysis, these are entirely concerned with the idea that
vertical integration by an upstream ￿rm into the downstream industry may facilitate upstream
collusion. The ￿rst set of remarks (4.221) pertains to the idea that vertical integration may
facilitate the monitoring of price if downstream prices are more visible than upstream prices.
We tackle this issue tangentially in section 5 where we consider the case when upstream o⁄ers
are secret. In this section we continue to assume that upstream o⁄ers are public and we analyze
the second set of remarks, (4.222) Elimination of a Disruptive Buyer, which state:
The elimination by vertical merger of a particularly disruptive buyer in a downstream
market may facilitate collusion in the upstream market. If upstream ￿rms view sales to
a particular buyer as su¢ ciently important, they may deviate from the terms of a collu-
sive agreement in an e⁄ort to secure that business, thereby disrupting the operation of the
agreement. The merger of such a buyer with an upstream ￿rm may eliminate that rivalry,
making it easier for the upstream ￿rms to collude e⁄ectively. Adverse competitive conse-
quences are unlikely unless the upstream market is generally conducive to collusion and the
disruptive ￿rm is signi￿cantly more attractive to sellers than the other ￿rms in its market.
The Department is unlikely to challenge a merger on this ground unless 1) overall
concentration of the upstream market is 1800 HHI or above... and 2) the allegedly disruptive
12That is to say, each successive merger will increase the set of ￿rms which can privately deviate and reduce
the set of ￿rms which su⁄er from a reaction e⁄ect. This is, of course, an extremely loose statement. Within
the strict context of our model, the only vertical merger which is actually harmful is the one which reduces the
critical discount factor below ￿rms￿actual discount factor, and this may or may not be the ￿rst integration.
13US government policy towards vertical mergers is now governed largely by consideration of what may loosely
be termed theories of ￿ raising rivals costs￿(see, e.g., Riordan and Salop, 1995) rather than the ￿ coordinated e⁄ects￿
model considered here.
14In particular, our outlets e⁄ect, whereby integration removes an outlet through which a deviating upstream
￿rm would like to sell, resembles the type of exclusion envisioned by the informal pre-Chicago theories of
foreclosure. Unlike these theories, however, our own is immune to Bork￿ s stinging criticism that such problems
could be solved by holding an ￿industry social mixer￿(Bork, 1978). We thank Mike Riordan for this observation.
15￿rm di⁄ers substantially in volume of purchases or other relevant characteristics from the
other ￿rms in its market...
We have already seen that the emphasis on the idea that integration is damaging only
when the integrated downstream ￿rm di⁄ers substantially from its rivals is misplaced: we
showed that adverse competitive consequences arise in models with symmetric downstream
￿rms. Nevertheless, if downstream ￿rms are asymmetric, merger with one ￿rm may facilitate
collusion to a greater or lesser extent than merger with another. In the following subsections
we investigate how one might identify a ￿ disruptive buyer￿ .
4.1 Bertrand Competition Downstream with Asymmetric Costs
We now reconsider Bertrand competition downstream but suppose that the downstream ￿rms
have asymmetric marginal costs. We simplify to the case of just two upstream and two down-
stream ￿rms. As before, U1, U2, and D1 have zero marginal costs. However, we now assume
that D2 is less e¢ cient and has marginal cost c 2 (0;pM). Thus, in the non-collusive equilib-
rium, D1 makes pro￿t cD(c), while D2 makes no pro￿t. Note that for e¢ cient collusion, along
the equilibrium path no sales should be made through the ine¢ cient downstream ￿rm.
Non-Integration. Suppose ￿rst that no ￿rm is vertically integrated. The optimal collusive
scheme is for each upstream ￿rm to o⁄er a wholesale price of pM to the e¢ cient downstream
￿rm D1 and of pM ￿c to the ine¢ cient downstream ￿rm D2, with no ￿xed fees in either case.
In the most collusive equilibrium, D1 must purchase QM=2 from each of the two upstream
￿rms. The best deviation consists in o⁄ering D1 a wholesale price of pM ￿ " (or equivalently,
a wholesale price of zero and a ￿xed fee equal to ￿M). With symmetric market shares, the




E¢ cient Firm (U1-D1) Integration. Suppose now that one upstream ￿rm, U1 say, is
vertically integrated with the e¢ cient downstream ￿rm, D1. Again, the e¢ cient collusive
scheme involves sales only through the e¢ cient downstream ￿rm, so that the integrated D1
must buy some output from the unintegrated U2. If U1 ￿ D1 is allocated a collusive market
share ￿; this can be achieved by having U2 o⁄er D1 a wholesale price of zero with a ￿xed fee of
(1￿￿)￿M; a wholesale price of pM with D1 purchasing a quantity (1￿￿)QM from D2, or any
combination in between. When the integrated pair deviates, it can reject U2￿ s o⁄er (indeed, it
strictly prefers to do so if this o⁄er involves a positive ￿xed fee) and make no purchases from
U2. In this way, U1￿D1 can get ￿M from deviating, and cD(c) in the punishment phase when
both upstream ￿rms supply both downstream ￿rms at marginal cost. The e¢ cient integrated







Consider now the unintegrated upstream ￿rm U2￿ s incentive to deviate. In contrast to the
case with symmetric downstream ￿rms, the outlets e⁄ect reduces the unintegrated upstream
16￿rm￿ s incentives to deviate. Even if the integrated pair, U1￿D1, were committed to charging
the monopoly price in the downstream market, U2 could not get the monopoly pro￿t by





In addition to the outlets e⁄ect, there is a strong reaction e⁄ect (as in the case of symmetric
downstream ￿rms): any deviant o⁄er to D2 can be immediately and severely punished by the
integrated e¢ cient pair, which will price just below whatever wholesale price U2 o⁄ers to D2.





Hence, by reorganizing market shares in favor of the e¢ cient integrated pair, the critical dis-
count factor (above which collusion can be sustained) can be made arbitrarily small. This
turns out not to be the case when it is the ine¢ cient downstream ￿rm which is integrated.
Ine¢ cient Firm (U1-D2) Integration. Suppose now that one of the upstream ￿rms, U1
say, integrates with the ine¢ cient downstream ￿rm. As under non-integration, the optimal
collusive scheme involves both upstream ￿rms selling to D1 at wholesale price pM (and zero
￿xed fee), with D1 purchasing a fraction ￿ of its output from U1 and the remaining fraction
1￿￿ from U2. No sales are made through D2: The optimal deviation for the unintegrated U2
is to undercut the o⁄er to D1, either by o⁄ering a wholesale price of 0 and a ￿xed fee of cD(c),
or by o⁄ering a wholesale price of c and a ￿xed fee of 0 (or some equivalent combination in
between).15 There is no outlets e⁄ect here: if D2 were committed to charging the monopoly
price, U2 could still obtain the monopoly pro￿t by deviating through the e¢ cient downstream
￿rm, D1. However, U1 ￿ D2 can react to U2￿ s deviation, which reduces U2￿ s deviation pro￿t.
The reaction e⁄ect is smaller than in the case where it is the e¢ cient ￿rm that is integrated
since the ine¢ cient integrated pair cannot credibly threaten to price lower than their combined




Now consider the integrated ￿rm, U1￿D2. Because it is relatively ine¢ cient, it will make
no pro￿ts in the punishment phase, so there is no punishment e⁄ect. The integrated ￿rm can
deviate as in the unintegrated case by slightly undercutting U2 and o⁄ering a wholesale price
of pM ￿ " (and no ￿xed fee), so that D1 makes all its purchases through U1 and the latter
can earn arbitrarily close to the monopoly pro￿t. The integrated ￿rm will thus be willing to




Reallocation of the market shares in favor of the integrated ￿rm can improve collusive prospects
relative to the unintegrated case, but cannot achieve as low a critical discount factor as in the
case of integration with the e¢ cient downstream ￿rm. This result obtains because both the
15For the usual reasons, the unintegrated U2 cannot pro￿tably deviate through the integrated D2 as U1￿D2
would rather deviate on their own account if collusion were to break down anyway.
17reaction and outlets e⁄ects are weaker than in the latter case. To see this, consider ￿rst the





D(pM) = cD(pM), while the reaction e⁄ect further reduces




D(pM). Consider now the case of U1 ￿ D2 integration. As
explained above, there is no outlets e⁄ect. Moreover, the reaction e⁄ect reduces U2￿ s deviation





the reaction e⁄ect under U1 ￿ D1 integration.
Proposition 3 In the Bertrand model with public o⁄ers and downstream cost di⁄erences, up-
stream collusion is most facilitated by integrating with the most e¢ cient downstream ￿rm.
So, in the case of Bertrand competition with public o⁄ers, it is the e¢ cient buyer which is
￿ disruptive￿in the sense that integration with this buyer most facilitates collusion. While both
the reaction and outlets e⁄ect are stronger under the e¢ cient integration, the result is not a
priori obvious since integrating with the e¢ cient buyer also results in an o⁄setting punishment
e⁄ect, while integrating with the ine¢ cient buyer does not. As in section 3.2 above, however,
the increased punishment e⁄ect is o⁄set by the larger reaction and outlets e⁄ects.
4.2 Cournot Competition Downstream with Limited Capacities
We now turn to a di⁄erent form of asymmetry downstream which seems to be important in
practice: downstream ￿rms may have di⁄erent capacities to process upstream inputs. Specif-
ically, we assume that downstream ￿rms compete in quantities, simplify to the case of two
upstream and downstream ￿rms and suppose that: D2 faces a binding capacity constraint
QM=2 ￿ k2 < qC(N = 2) (where qC(N = 2) denotes the downstream Cournot output when
there are two competing ￿rms), whereas D1 does not face a binding capacity constraint, since
k1 ￿ QM. We continue to assume zero marginal costs both upstream and downstream.
In the noncollusive equilibrium, the smaller buyer, D2, faces a binding capacity constraint
and produces k2, while the larger D1 does not and produces the Cournot best-reply output to
k2, r(k2). This holds independently of whether or not some ￿rms are vertically integrated.
Non-Integration. Suppose ￿rst that no ￿rm is vertically integrated. As in the case without
capacity constraints (section 3.2 above), on the equilibrium path o⁄ers are the two part tari⁄s
which induce each downstream ￿rm to produce half the monopoly quantity and extract all
downstream ￿rm rents. Deviating o⁄ers similarly just undercut rivals￿￿xed fee o⁄ers, leaving
wholesale prices unchanged. In the absence of any integration in the industry, the collusive




and so the critical discount factor is b ￿
NI
= 1=2.
Single Integration with the Large Downstream Firm (U1 ￿ D1). Suppose now that one
upstream ￿rm, U1 say, is vertically integrated with the larger downstream ￿rm, D1. The
integrated ￿rm deviates as in the standard Cournot case by o⁄ering a contract with a prohibitive
18wholesale price p ￿ pM to the small, unintegrated downstream ￿rm D2, which then rejects
its on-the-equilibrium-path o⁄er and produces nothing; the integrated D1 then best-responds
to this by producing QM. In the punishment phase, the integrated ￿rm earns more than
previously, namely r(k2)P(k2 + r(k2)), since its downstream rival is capacity-constrained in
the noncollusive equilibrium. Let the collusive market share of the integrated ￿rm be ￿, which
must exceed 1
2 if vertical integration is to facilitate collusion.16 The incentive constraint for






r(k2)P(k2 + r(k2)): (7)
Consider now the unintegrated upstream ￿rm, U2. Along the collusive equilibrium path,
U2 may make sales either through D1 or D2. But the presence of the outlets e⁄ect means that
it can deviate only by selling to D2. The reaction of the integrated ￿rm then further limits
pro￿ts to k2P(k2 + r(k2)). The incentive constraint for the unintegrated U2 is therefore:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
1 ￿ ￿
￿ k2P(k2 + r(k2)): (8)





￿M ￿ [r(k2) ￿ k2]P(k2 + r(k2))
:
This is less than 1=2 if and only if ￿M > [k2 + r(k2)]P(k2 + r(k2)), i.e., if and only if the
monopoly pro￿t is larger than the industry pro￿t in the noncollusive equilibrium. This in-
equality clearly holds. Hence, single integration with the large downstream ￿rm facilitates
upstream collusion.
Single Integration with the Small Downstream Firm (U1 ￿ D2). Suppose now that one
upstream ￿rm, U1 say, is vertically integrated with the smaller downstream ￿rm, D2. The
optimal collusive scheme in this case depends on the exact level of D2￿ s capacity: if U1 were
to sell through its own downstream a¢ liate, D2, and U2 through the unintegrated D1, D2￿ s
equilibrium output would be ￿QM, where ￿ is again the integrated ￿rm￿ s market share. Since
optimal collusion requires giving a larger market share to the integrated ￿rm, ￿ > 1=2, we may
have ￿QM > k2, and so D2 may be unable to sell ￿QM. Hence, the optimal collusive scheme
may require that the integrated U1 sells through the unintegrated D1. But D1 will accept only
one o⁄er involving a positive ￿xed fee, so it cannot be induced to accept any o⁄er from the
unintegrated U2. Therefore, U2 must sell (1￿￿)QM through the integrated D2 (at wholesale
price 0 and ￿xed fee (1 ￿ ￿)￿M). To minimize U1￿ s incentive to deviate secretly through D2,
U1 should sell as much as feasible through D2, namely k2 ￿(1￿￿)QM, and sell the remaining
QM ￿k2 units through D1. When deviating, U1￿D2 can either deviate publicly or privately.
By deviating publicly, it can obtain the monopoly pro￿t, namely by rejecting U2￿ s o⁄er to D2,
and charging a wholesale price and ￿xed fee to D1 that induces D1 to produce QM ￿k2, fully
16Because of the punishment e⁄ect, the integrated ￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate will rise on integration unless
its market share is increased.
19anticipating that D2 will produce its capacity output k2. However, U1 ￿ D1 might obtain a
larger deviation pro￿t by deviating secretly downstream: this will require that the ￿xed fee




D1 and, in addition, the Cournot best-reply pro￿t to D1￿ s equilibrium output, R(QM ￿ k2).
In the ensuing punishment phase, the integrated ￿rm obtains the noncollusive pro￿t of its
(capacity-constrained) downstream a¢ liate, k2P(k2 + r(k2)). The incentive constraint for the









int ￿ ￿M is the deviation pro￿t of the integrated ￿rm.
Since the integrated ￿rm can react to any deviation by the unintegrated U2, the uninte-
grated upstream ￿rm￿ s deviation pro￿t is r(k2)P(k2 + r(k2)). The incentive constraint for the
unintegrated U1 is thus:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
1 ￿ ￿
￿ r(k2)P(k2 + r(k2)):





int ￿ ￿M + r(k2)P(k2 + r(k2))
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U2￿D2 with b ￿
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U1￿D1, it can easily be veri￿ed that the former is larger than the
latter. We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 In the Cournot model with asymmetric capacities, upstream collusion is most
facilitated by vertically integrating with the largest downstream ￿rm.
4.3 Implications for Policy
The preceding models try to formalize the idea of a ￿disruptive buyer￿- which is to say, a buyer
whose presence particularly disrupts collusion, and with whom vertical merger particularly
enhances collusive possibilities. When upstream o⁄ers are public, then - intuitively - it is the
more e¢ cient or larger buyer who is ￿ disruptive￿ . The intuition behind this result is two-fold.
First and most obviously, price-cutting to this buyer is particularly tempting, so the ￿ outlets
e⁄ect￿of removing a desirable recipient of deviating o⁄ers is greatest on integrating with this
buyer. The outlets e⁄ect yields consequences similar to those envisioned in the Guidelines by
removing an attractive outlet for deviant o⁄ers. But such integration is really a double-edged
sword, as integration with a particularly e¢ cient or large buyer also makes it more tempting
for the integrated ￿rm to cheat because it insulates him from punishment by his rivals. That
is, the o⁄setting punishment is also larger. The second, less obvious reason why integration
with the more e¢ cient buyer is desirable is because it allows more ￿ exible contracts with this
20particular buyer and hence a stronger ￿ reaction e⁄ect￿to deviations by other ￿rms. Integration
with the e¢ cient or larger buyer most facilitates collusion because, as above, the outlets and
reaction e⁄ects together o⁄set the punishment e⁄ect.
5 Secret O⁄ers
In this section, we examine the robustness of our previous results to the assumption that
upstream ￿rms make public o⁄ers, since the reaction e⁄ect in particular appears prima facie
to depend on this assumption. We show that our result that vertical integration facilitates
collusion still goes through in two simple models of downstream competition where upstream
o⁄ers are secret. The game examined is essentially the same as set out in section 2 above,
except that the terms of each o⁄er made in stage 1, and whether or not it was accepted in
stage 2, are known only to the two contracting parties at stage 3 when downstream ￿rms
must choose their strategic variable (price or quantity). In order to avoid the complications
associated with repeated games of imperfect public monitoring, we add a fourth stage, at the
end of the period, after downstream pro￿ts are realized, when all actions (e.g., o⁄ers, signed
contracts, etc.) are publicly revealed. For simplicity, we will continue to assume throughout
this section that upstream ￿rms￿marginal cost c = 0.17
Public History vs. Private History. Let ￿i￿ = (￿i1;￿i2;:::;￿iN) denote the vector of Ui￿ s
o⁄ers to downstream ￿rms, ￿￿j = (￿1j;￿2j;:::;￿Nj) the vector of o⁄ers received by Dj, and ￿ =
(￿1￿;￿2￿;:::;￿M￿) the vector of all o⁄ers. Moreover, we denote by ht￿1 = (ht￿2;￿t￿1;￿t￿1;pt￿1)
the public history at the end of period t￿1. Since all actions are publicly revealed at the end of
the period and since we do not allow for private randomization, ht￿1 is also each ￿rm￿ s private
history at the end of period t ￿ 1. At the beginning of each of the stages 1, 2, and 3 in period
t, the public history is still ht￿1. At the beginning of stage 2 in period t, Ui￿ s private history
is (ht￿1;￿t
i), while Dj￿ s private history is (ht￿1;￿t
￿j). At the beginning of stage 3 in period
t, Ui￿ s private history is (ht￿1;￿t
i￿;￿t
i￿), while Dj￿ s private history is (ht￿1;￿t
￿j;￿t
￿j). Vertical
integration between Ui and Dj means that the two a¢ liates share all information, and so have
the same private history.
Because downstream ￿rms must now choose their strategic variable in ignorance of the
contracts accepted by their rivals, we now need to specify how they form beliefs about these
contracts (and indeed about their rivals￿ strategic choices in response to these contracts).
Along the equilibrium path, beliefs are pinned down by equilibrium play, since beliefs must
be correct in equilibrium. O⁄-the-equilibrium-path, however, perfect Bayesian equilibrium
does not restrict the downstream ￿rms￿beliefs. Clearly, if we allow an arbitrary choice of
o⁄-the-equilibrium path beliefs, then an extremely large set of outcomes can be sustained, even
in the static game.18 Therefore any interesting analysis of the e⁄ect of vertical integration on
17For c > 0, there are existence problems in the Bertrand game with passive beliefs, see Rey and VergØ (2002);
although O￿ Brien and Scha⁄er (1992) show that there do exist ￿ contracts equilibria￿(Cremer and Riordan, 1988).
18For example, in the Bertrand price-setting game, if downstream ￿rms react to any deviant o⁄er by antici-
pating that the same upstream ￿rm will have priced at cost to its rivals, then on receiving a deviant o⁄er with
a wholesale price above cost each downstream ￿rm expects to sell nothing and may as well choose to price arbi-
trarily highly. In this case, no pro￿t can be made from deviation and the monopoly outcome can be sustained
21collusion in this set up requires some form of restriction on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs.
For the main body of this section we follow what is by now something of a convention in
the literature on foreclosure and vertical restraints where this problem arises in making the
assumption of so-called passive beliefs. If an upstream ￿rm deviates from its equilibrium o⁄er
to a ￿rm, we assume that the downstream ￿rm obtaining the deviant o⁄er continues to believe
that its downstream rivals continue to be o⁄ered their equilibrium contracts (i.e., that it is the
only ￿rm receiving a deviant o⁄er). This way of modeling beliefs certainly has the advantage
of simplicity; for further description and motivation of passive beliefs, see Hart and Tirole
(1990); Rey and Tirole (1997); Segal (1999); McAfee and Schwartz (1994). We brie￿ y discuss
robustness of our results to other forms of beliefs in the appendix.
With passive beliefs, as under public o⁄ers, the noncollusive equilibrium o⁄ers must be such
that (i) each upstream ￿rm makes zero pro￿t (on sales to unintegrated downstream ￿rms), and
(ii) each o⁄er to an (unintegrated) downstream ￿rm (that is accepted in equilibrium) maximizes
the bilateral rents, given the set of other o⁄ers that are accepted in equilibrium.
5.1 Bertrand Competition
Suppose downstream ￿rms compete in prices. Independently of market structure, the noncollu-
sive equilibrium then involves zero industry pro￿ts. In particular, the (secret) take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄ers are of the form (wij;Fij) = (0;0), and each downstream ￿rm Dj sets price pj = 0. In the
collusive equilibrium, the upstream ￿rms extract monopoly rents from the downstream ￿rms
by o⁄ering (secret) contracts of the form (wij;Fij) = (pM;0), and so downstream ￿rms set
prices equal to the monopoly price.
Non-Integration. Consider ￿rst the case where no ￿rm is vertically integrated. On the
collusive equilibrium path, each upstream ￿rm will receive 1=Mth of the monopoly pro￿t.
(Since ￿rms are symmetric, the symmetric market share allocation equates their incentives to
cheat to minimize the critical discount factor.) An upstream ￿rm optimally deviates by o⁄ering
contracts of the form (wij;Fij) = (0;￿M ￿") to each of the N downstream ￿rms, where " > 0 is
arbitrarily small. Given passive beliefs, a downstream ￿rm receiving a deviant o⁄er anticipates
that its downstream rivals will still be receiving their equilibrium o⁄ers and pricing at pM. The
downstream ￿rm thus believes that by accepting the deviant o⁄er, it can slightly undercut its
rivals and make some (arbitrarily small) rents. The deviant upstream ￿rm can thus extract
(almost) the monopoly pro￿t from each of the N downstream ￿rms. In the ensuing punishment












Single Integration. We now consider what happens to the ability to collude if one upstream-
downstream pair - say U1￿D1 - vertically integrates. On the equilibrium path, the integrated
even in the static game.
22￿rm￿ s market share is ￿, where ￿ is optimally chosen so as to minimize the critical discount
factor. Suppose an unintegrated downstream ￿rm, say D2, receives a deviant o⁄er from the
integrated upstream ￿rm U1. Having passive beliefs, D2 continues to believe that the other
unintegrated downstream ￿rms, D3 to DN, received their equilibrium o⁄ers. So, if U1￿ s deviant
o⁄er involves a wholesale price 0 < w12 < pM, D2 believes that it could undercut D3 to DN in
the retail market if it decided to accept the deviant o⁄er. However, since U1 and D1 act as one
player, D2 correctly anticipates that if it were to accept U1￿ s o⁄er at stage 2, then the integrated
D1 (with e⁄ective marginal cost of 0) would charge a retail price of w12 ￿ " at stage 3. This
is an implication of subgame perfection and the extensive form of the game, which stipulates
that D1 chooses its retail price only after learning whether an unintegrated downstream ￿rm
accepted U1￿ s o⁄er. It follows that an unintegrated downstream ￿rm will reject any deviant
o⁄er by U1 that involves a positive ￿xed fee, and so U1￿ s deviation pro￿t is bounded from
above by the monopoly pro￿t. By slightly undercutting its rivals in the downstream market or
by o⁄ering (pM ￿";￿") to an unintegrated downstream ￿rm, U1￿D1 can obtain (almost) the





Thus, unlike in the public o⁄ers cases studied above, vertical integration reduces the deviation
pro￿t of the integrated ￿rm.19 We call this the lack-of-commitment e⁄ect.20 It arises because
the integrated ￿rm cannot commit not to choose the best reply in the downstream market to
its own upstream a¢ liate￿ s deviation vis-￿-vis an unintegrated downstream ￿rm.21
We now examine an unintegrated upstream ￿rm￿ s - say U2￿ s - incentive to cheat. Along the
equilibrium path, each unintegrated upstream ￿rm has a market share of (1￿￿)=(M ￿1). If it
deviates, it can extract ￿M from each of the N ￿ 1 unintegrated downstream ￿rm by o⁄ering
(0;￿M ￿"). However, the deviant upstream ￿rm, U2, will not ￿nd it pro￿table to sell through
the integrated downstream ￿rm. To see this, note that the most rent that can (pro￿tably)
be o⁄ered by U2 in the deviating phase is ￿M. By receiving the deviant o⁄er, the integrated
downstream ￿rm knows that the industry will revert to the punishment in the next period.
If collusion is expected to break down, then the integrated ￿rm should optimally deviate on
19Vertical integration does not a⁄ect the integrated ￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate with public o⁄ers since the
outlets and reaction e⁄ects a⁄ect only its rivals.
20The lack-of-commitment e⁄ect can in some ways be viewed as the ￿ ip side of the reaction e⁄ect. Both
e⁄ects arise from the increased ￿ exibility of contracting between an integrated pair. The reaction e⁄ect arises
because such ￿ exibility allows a swifter reaction to deviation; the lack of commitment e⁄ect because a deviating
pair cannot commit not to best-respond to any deviating o⁄ers it makes to other ￿rms. Both e⁄ects facilitate
collusion.
21If U1￿ s o⁄er and the choice of D1￿ s price were made simultaneously, then Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium would
not pin down D2￿ s beliefs about D1￿ s price (in the event of D2 receiving a deviant o⁄er from U1). Under our
assumption of passive beliefs, D2 would be willing to accept the contract (0;￿
M ￿ "). Hence, U1 could extract
N ￿ 1 times the monopoly pro￿t from the N ￿ 1 unintegrated downstream ￿rms, and by undercutting these
in the retail market, obtain another ￿
M through its own downstream a¢ liate, D1. U1 ￿ D1￿ s deviation pro￿t
would thus be N￿
M, exactly as under non-integration. It can readily be seen however, that even in with this
modi￿ed timing, vertical integration would still facilitate upstream collusion because it reduces the unintegrated
upstream ￿rms￿incentive to cheat (see below).
23its own account and (having passive beliefs) expect to make ￿M. Hence, the unintegrated
upstream ￿rm has no incentive to cheat if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
(M ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (N ￿ 1)￿M:






M(N ￿ 1) + 1
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, and so we have the following result.
Proposition 5 In the Bertrand model with secret o⁄ers, (single) vertical integration facilitates
upstream collusion.
The intuition for this result is the following. By buying up one of the downstream ￿rms, an
upstream ￿rm can foreclose a buyer from potential deviant o⁄ers from his rival, reducing his
rival￿ s incentive to deviate. This is the by now familiar outlets e⁄ect. Buying up a downstream
￿rm reduces the number of outlets through which an upstream ￿rm can sell the additional
output when cheating by foreclosing access to the integrated downstream unit. One might
think that when - as here - downstream ￿rms￿products are perfect substitutes, this e⁄ect
would be irrelevant, as indeed it is in the Bertrand model with public o⁄ers. But with secret
o⁄ers and passive beliefs it matters because upstream ￿rms can expropriate downstream ￿rms
when they cheat on the collusive agreement, taking advantage of the downstream ￿rms￿passive
belief that they are the only ￿rm with whom the upstream ￿rm has cheated. In addition to
the outlets e⁄ect, the passive beliefs also give rise to a lack-of-commitment e⁄ect, whereby the
integrated ￿rm cannot commit to best respond to his own deviant o⁄ers. This reduces U1￿ s
deviation pro￿t, so that unlike in the public o⁄ers case, integration also reduces the integrated
￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate.22
Multiple Integration. The above intuition extends to the case of more than one integrated
￿rm. If U2 were to integrate with D2, for instance, then U2￿ s incentive to deviate will be
reduced (provided there is at least one other unintegrated downstream ￿rm) due to the lack-of-
commitment e⁄ect, and the remaining unintegrated upstream ￿rms￿incentives to deviate will
be reduced due to the outlets e⁄ect. Consider the more general case when 1 ￿ K ￿ M ￿rms
are integrated. The optimal market share allocation is such that each integrated ￿rm has a
market share of ￿=K, and that each unintegrated ￿rm has a market share of (1￿￿)=(M ￿K).




22Note that vertical integration would still facilitate collusion in this model even if the timing of the game
were slightly changed, so that the upstream ￿rm chooses his own downstream output simultaneously with his
o⁄ers to the upstream ￿rms, and the lack of commitment e⁄ect does not arise. We chose to study the more
natural timing where all downstream ￿rms choose output simultaneously, rather than D1 choosing beforehand
in the o⁄er stage.
24Similarly, an unintegrated upstream ￿rm will not deviate if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
(M ￿ K)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (N ￿ K)￿M: (11)
Since an unintegrated ￿rm has a higher deviation pro￿t than an integrated ￿rm (provided there
is at least one unintegrated downstream ￿rm), and since the deviation pro￿t of all unintegrated
￿rms is decreasing in the number of unintegrated downstream ￿rms, the critical discount factor
is decreasing in K, the number of integrated ￿rms. Therefore each successive vertical merger
facilitates collusion.23 We summarize our result in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the Bertrand model with secret o⁄ers, each successive vertical integration
further facilitates upstream collusion. (The only exception arises if M = N, where the Mth
vertical integration leaves the critical discount factor unchanged.)
5.2 Cournot Competition
Suppose now that downstream ￿rms compete in quantities. For simplicity, we restrict attention
to the case of an equal number of upstream and downstream ￿rms: M = N.
Noncollusive Equilibrium. Independently of market structure, the noncollusive equilibrium
involves each upstream ￿rms making (secret) take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers of the form (wij;Fij) =
(0;0) to all unintegrated downstream ￿rms, and thus zero pro￿ts in the upstream market.24
Facing such o⁄ers, each downstream ￿rm Dj sells the Cournot equilibrium output of a symmet-
ric M-￿rm Cournot oligopoly (with zero marginal cost). Each downstream ￿rm￿ s noncollusive
pro￿t is denoted by ￿C(M).
Non-Integration. Consider ￿rst the case where no ￿rm is vertically integrated. In any
perfectly collusive scheme, each upstream ￿rm must sell to a di⁄erent downstream ￿rm. (Be-
cause of double marginalization, the optimal contract must involve a wholesale price below the
monopoly price and a positive ￿xed fee. Hence, each downstream is willing to accept at most
one contract in equilibrium.) Without loss of generality, suppose that along the equilibrium
path Ui sells a fraction ￿i of the monopoly quantity to Di, where ￿i ￿ ￿i+1 and
P
i ￿i = 1.
Ui￿ s o⁄er to Di then takes the form wii = P(QM) + ￿iQMP0(QM) and Fii = ￿2
ii￿M. These
contracts ensure that each downstream ￿rm produces the desired fraction of the monopoly
quantity and all rents are extracted. The optimal deviation for any upstream ￿rm consists
in o⁄ering the contract (0;R
￿
(1 ￿ ￿j)QM) ￿ "
￿
to each downstream ￿rm Dj, j = 1;:::;M.
23Instead of multiple vertical integration, the monopoly outcome could also be achieved by having U1 take
over all the downstream ￿rms. Most likely, however, this would be prevented by anti-trust authorities since
it would make monopoly inevitable by completely foreclosing all other upstream ￿rms from the downstream
market.
24Obviously, an unintegrated upstream ￿rm cannot pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering a di⁄erent contract. One
may think, however, that an integrated ￿rm can pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering a positive wholesale price (perhaps
in conjunction with a negative ￿xed fee) as its own downstream a¢ liate would bene￿t from softer competition
downstream. This intuition is false, however. To see this, note that if the integrated upstream ￿rm were to o⁄er
a contract with a positive wholesale price, the receiving unintegrated downstream ￿rm would still accept the
contract (0;0) o⁄ered by the (unintegrated) upstream ￿rm, and subsequently order all its inputs at this lower
wholesale price.
25Here, R(Q) denotes the pro￿t from the static Cournot best reply to a rival￿ s output of Q,
i.e., R(Q) = maxq qP(Q + q). Since the deviation pro￿t is the same for all upstream ￿rms
but U1has (by assumption) the (weakly) smallest equilibrium market share, in determining
the critical discount factor we need to consider only U1￿ s no-cheating constraint. U1 has no










One can show that under very general conditions R(Q) must be convex in Q, and so the optimal
market share arrangement involves equal market shares, ￿i = 1=M for all i = 1;:::;M.25 The
no-cheating constraint thus simpli￿es to
￿M
M (1 ￿ ￿)


















Single Integration. We now examine the case where one upstream-downstream pair, U1￿D1
say, is integrated. One can envisage various collusive schemes. One example would be a cross-
selling arrangement where U1 sells its output through the unintegrated downstream ￿rms,
while the unintegrated downstream ￿rms sell their output through the integrated downstream
25The best-reply pro￿t R(Q) is given by
R(Q) = r(Q)P(Q + r(Q));
where r(Q) is the best-reply to Q, i.e.,
P(Q + r(Q)) + r(Q)P
0(Q + r(Q)) = 0:




















0(Q + r(Q)) + r(Q)P
00(Q + r(Q))
2P 0(Q + r(Q)) + r(Q)P 00(Q + r(Q))
;
and so R






2P 0(Q + r(Q)) + r(Q)P 00(Q + r(Q))
:
This expression is strictly positive since the denominator must be negative for r(Q) to be the best-reply to Q:
26￿rm D1. This scheme would generate a form of reaction e⁄ect even though o⁄ers are secret.
U1￿ s o⁄er to Dj, j 6= 1, must involve a ￿xed fee. This means that if an unintegrated Ui, i 6= 1,
were to deviate by making an o⁄er to Dj, Dj might be tempted to reject U1￿ s equilibrium o⁄er
to save the ￿xed fee, alerting U1 ￿ D1 to the deviation and allowing them to react. To avoid
such a rejection and have Dj instead accept both U1￿ s equilibrium o⁄er and Ui￿ s deviant o⁄er,
Ui￿ s o⁄er would need to leave some rents to Dj (so that Dj can pay the ￿xed fee to U1). This
clearly reduces the attractiveness of deviation for Ui. It can easily be veri￿ed that, if demand
is linear, this collusive scheme results in a critical discount factor that is lower than that under
non-integration.
To show that vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion for general demand, it is
su¢ cient to show that there exists one collusive scheme that implies a lower critical discount
factor than without integration. We consider the simplest collusive scheme, where in equilib-
rium, the integrated U1 sells a fraction ￿ of the monopoly output through its own downstream
a¢ liate, while any unintegrated Ui sells a fraction (1 ￿ ￿)=(M ￿ 1) of the monopoly output
through the unintegrated Di.
Consider ￿rst U1￿ s incentive to deviate. Suppose that if Di (i 6= 1) were to accept a
deviant o⁄er from U1, Di would in the ensuing subgame produce a quantity q. While Di
has passive beliefs about U1￿ s o⁄ers to all other unintegrated downstream ￿rms, subgame
perfection requires that it rationally anticipates D1￿ s response to its acceptance at the output
stage which follows. Di knows that D1 shares all information with its upstream a¢ liate U1,
and so anticipates that D1 will produce the Cournot best-reply output to the output choice
of all the unintegrated downstream ￿rms, taking into account Di￿ s acceptance of U1￿ s deviant
o⁄er. Because U1 is integrated with D1, U1 is unable to commit to maintaining D1￿ s output at
the collusive level. This lack of commitment hurts the integrated ￿rm because its anticipated
expansion of output will reduce Di￿ s willingness to pay for a deviant contract compared to
the case where U1 is not integrated (and where Di would have passive beliefs about D1￿ s
output). For a contract which induces an output of q, Di is therefore willing to pay (through















where (M ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿)QM=(M ￿ 1) is the quantity that Di (having passive beliefs) expects







quantity Di expects D1 to produce if Di accepts the deviant contract.
When deviating, U1 therefore chooses to sell q units through each of the unintegrated
downstream ￿rms (and to sell r((M ￿1)q) through its own downstream a¢ liate, D1), where q
26With secret o⁄ers and Cournot competition, the precise division of Di￿ s payment into ￿xed fee and quantity
times wholesale price is, from U1￿ s point of view, less important than in the foregoing, since contracts are secret
and quantities are ordered in ignorance of the market price. So unlike in the Bertrand or public o⁄ers cases,
Di￿ s actual payment will not vary with o⁄ers accepted by the other downstream ￿rms.















+r((M ￿ 1)q)P ((M ￿ 1)q + r((M ￿ 1)q)).
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem is to set q = 0. U1 will not sell
through the unintegrated downstream ￿rms but instead sell the monopoly quantity through
its own downstream a¢ liate. By o⁄ering a wholesale price w ￿ pM (and a slightly negative
￿xed fee), U1 can ￿signal￿its intention to deviate and thus make sure that all the unintegrated
downstream ￿rms will accept U1￿ s o⁄er, reject their other o⁄ers, and produce nothing (exactly
as in the case of public o⁄ers). The integrated ￿rm can thus obtain only the monopoly pro￿t







where the last term represents the punishment e⁄ect. Comparing (13) with (12), we can see
that integration reduces the integrating ￿rm￿ s deviation pro￿t. This is due to the lack-of-
commitment e⁄ect described above: an unintegrated ￿rm does not trust the integrated ￿rm
not to best respond to its own deviant o⁄er, so integration makes it more di¢ cult for U1 to
expropriate unintegrated downstream ￿rms.27
Consider now the incentives to deviate for an unintegrated upstream ￿rm, Ui, i 6= 1. Again,
Ui cannot pro￿tably cheat through the integrated D1 since the integrated ￿rm (expecting
collusion to break down) would then rather deviate on its own account (and, having passive
beliefs, expand D1￿ s output from ￿QM to R((1 ￿ ￿)QM)). Since Ui can pro￿tably cheat only
through the unintegrated downstream ￿rms, each of which believes that all other downstream








. Hence, Ui has no incentive to cheat if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿M
(M ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)









Comparing (14) with (12), we observe that vertical integration reduces an unintegrated up-
stream ￿rm￿ s incentive to deviate, holding ￿xed the market share allocation ￿ = 1=M. This
is due to the outlets e⁄ect. Ui cannot make a pro￿table o⁄er expropriating D1, and at the
output stage the latter, unaware of Ui￿ s deviation, continues to produce its collusive output.
Thus in the Cournot model with secret o⁄ers, three e⁄ects are present: the outlets, lack-of-
commitment, and punishment e⁄ects. As the following result indicates, it can be shown that
as before, the outlets and lack-of-commitment e⁄ect jointly outweigh the punishment e⁄ect.
27To be more precise, one could also consider that there is another e⁄ect at play here: a non-self expropriation
e⁄ect. Not only is it more di¢ cult for the integrated ￿rm to expropriate the remaining unintegrated downstream
￿rms, it also no longer desires to expropriate the ￿rm with which it has integrated.








6 Other Vertical Restraints
We now return to the model with public o⁄ers and consider to what extent other vertical
restraints can substitute for vertical integration in facilitating collusion. Note ￿rst that there
are several practical reasons why these other vertical restraints may be an imperfect substitute
for vertical integration. Firstly, the vertical integration of two ￿rms is presumably a long-term
decision. In order to be e⁄ective in facilitating collusion, other vertical restraints must also have
some form of long-term component. If they are simply o⁄ered together with the contract each
period and expire at the end of each period, then a deviating ￿rm can simply o⁄er a contract
without the restraint and the restraint will have no e⁄ect in preventing deviation in our model.
Therefore in the following we consider vertical restraints which are long-term in nature and
already in place when the game begins. Second, there is an issue as to the enforcement of these
vertical restraints. The enforcement of some vertical restraints may require the use of third
parties, which makes them somewhat more cumbersome to employ (Alexander and Rei⁄en,
1995). For example, if U1 and D1 sign an exclusive territories agreement, and then U1 sells
more to D1 and D1 breaks the exclusive territories agreement by infringing on some other
territory, it is not clear that U1 actually wishes to sue D1 for doing so - the damage has instead
been done to some other downstream ￿rm D2 (say), and it is up to D2 to sue. A similar issue
arises with resale price maintenance contracts.
6.1 Exclusive Dealing
If upstream ￿rms o⁄er exclusive dealing clauses28 together with their along-the-equilibrium-
path collusive o⁄ers, then as noted above, this will not facilitate collusion. Therefore consider
￿ long-term￿exclusive dealing contracts which have been signed before the game starts. We
assume that signing an exclusive dealing contract commits a downstream ￿rm to deal only
with one particular upstream ￿rm, although this downstream ￿rm is still free to reject this
upstream ￿rm￿ s o⁄er in any given period. Upstream ￿rms make take-it-or-leave-it two part
tari⁄ o⁄ers to their captive downstream ￿rms.29
28See Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Rasmusen et al. (1991), and Segal and Whinston (2000) for an analysis
of the anti-competitive e⁄ects of exclusive dealing in a static setting.
29This yields the closest parallel in the ex post division of rents to the vertical integration case. It may be
necessary to compensate downstream ￿rms with an ex ante lump sum payment for the loss of rents associated
with signing an exclusive dealing contract, in the same way that it may be necessary to pay up front to acquire
and vertically integrate with a downstream ￿rm. For brevity we do not explicitly analyse the size of this payment,
since it does not a⁄ect ex post incentives to collude. We simply assume that Coasian bargaining will occur so
that it is possible to agree on such a payment where it is jointly e¢ cient.
29Suppose that there are M upstream and N downstream ￿rms. Recall that without exclusive
dealing it is possible simply to undercut all one￿ s opponents￿o⁄ers slightly and extract the
monopoly pro￿t on deviating, so that an upstream ￿rm will collude only as long as ￿ ￿ (M ￿
1)=M. We now consider the sustainability of collusion when only one upstream-downstream
pair, U1 ￿ D1 say, have signed exclusive contracts.
Bertrand Competition. The exclusive dealing contract does not a⁄ect payo⁄s in the non-
collusive equilibrium, which still involves zero pro￿ts, both upstream and downstream. The
collusive equilibrium involves on-the-equilibrium-path wholesale prices of pM and no ￿xed fees.
Clearly, U1 can deviate exactly as without exclusive dealing and obtain a pro￿t arbitrarily close
to ￿M, so exclusive dealing does not a⁄ect his incentive to deviate. Given the exclusive dealing
agreement, however, no other upstream ￿rm Uj (j 6= 1) can gain D1￿ s business on deviating.
Nevertheless, in the Bertrand case there is no outlets e⁄ect since Uj is able to extract ￿M by
o⁄ering a wholesale price pM ￿ " to any other downstream ￿rm Dj (j 6= 1). Hence we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 8 In the Bertrand model, exclusive dealing does not facilitate upstream collusion:
the critical discount factor is the same as in the absence of exclusive dealing contracts.
Evidently, in the Bertrand case, signing an exclusive dealing contract is not a substitute for
vertically integrating as a means of facilitating collusion.
Cournot Competition. In the noncollusive equilibrium, exclusive dealing a⁄ects the distri-
bution of rents since U1 can extract the Cournot pro￿t of the ￿ captured￿D1, ￿C(N). This
implies that there is a punishment e⁄ect of exclusive dealing. As in the Cournot model of sec-
tion 3.2, the collusive equilibrium involves strictly positive wholesale prices and ￿xed fees, with
wholesale prices less than pM. Upstream ￿rm U1 can deviate by undercutting the ￿xed fees
o⁄ered to D2 to DN, and thus obtain the monopoly pro￿t. Hence, U1￿ s incentive constraint is
exactly as if U1 and D1 were vertically integrated (equation (5)). Whether exclusive dealing
is as e⁄ective as vertical integration in facilitating collusion thus hinges on Uj￿ s incentive to
deviate (j 6= 1). In fact, Uj has strictly more incentives to cheat, as we now show.
Proposition 9 In the Cournot model, exclusive dealing is less e⁄ective than vertical integra-
tion in facilitating upstream collusion: the critical discount factor is higher if one upstream-
downstream pair has an exclusive dealing contract than if the same ￿rms are vertically inte-
grated.
Proof. We need to show that Uj, j 6= 1, has a larger deviation pro￿t than when U1 and D1
are vertically integrated. Let (w0
ji;F0
ji) denote the optimal deviant o⁄ers of Uj to Di, i;j 6= 1,
when U1 and D1 are vertically integrated. Upon acceptance of these o⁄ers, the unintegrated
downstream ￿rms have to compete with each other as well as with the integrated D1, which
faces an e⁄ective wholesale price of 0.
Let w￿
11 > 0 denote D1￿ s equilibrium wholesale price in the exclusive dealing case. Suppose
a deviant Uj were to o⁄er the same wholesale prices w0
ji as in the vertically integrated case
to downstream ￿rms D2 to DN. Upon acceptance of these deviant o⁄ers, these downstream
￿rms would now compete with a D1 that faces the positive wholesale price w￿
11. They would
30thus make larger pro￿ts (gross of ￿xed costs) than in the case where U1 and D1 are vertically
integrated. (In fact, D1 may decide to reject its equilibrium contract after observing Uj￿ s
deviation. This would further increase the pro￿t of the remaining downstream ￿rms.) Thus
Uj can always obtain the same deviation pro￿t as under vertical integration, and by raising
the ￿xed fee to F00
ji > F0
ji on at least one of these o⁄ers can extract strictly more while the
downstream ￿rms still accept his o⁄ers.
Loosely speaking, exclusive dealing does not do as well as vertical integration because the
former entails the same outlets and punishment e⁄ects as the latter, but lacks a reaction e⁄ect.
U1 cannot optimally adjust D1￿ s output to punish a deviant Uj within the period because he
is committed to a given (high) wholesale price w￿
11. Moreover, to the extent that, given this
wholesale price, D1 chooses to adjust his output in response to the public deviation by Uj,
this will tend to make Uj￿ s deviation even more pro￿table since D1 will choose to shrink his
output or even reject his contract. That is, to the extent that there is any reaction e⁄ect at all
with exclusive dealing, it will tend to be of the opposite sign to the vertical integration case,
making collusion harder.
For this reason, it is not clear whether exclusive dealing per se actually facilitates collusion
or not. In the limit case as the number of downstream ￿rms becomes large, one can obtain the
following neutrality result.
Proposition 10 In the limit as the number of downstream ￿rms becomes large, N ! 1,
exclusive dealing contracts do not a⁄ect upstream collusion: the critical discount factor is the
same as in the absence of exclusive dealing contracts.
Proof. Since ￿C(N) ! 0 as N ! 1, the RHS of U1￿ s incentive constraint becomes the same
as in the absence of exclusive dealing. It remains to show that the RHS of Uj￿ s incentive
constraint (j 6= 1) is also una⁄ected by exclusive dealing in the limit as N ! 1. Since
o⁄ers are public, the deviation pro￿t of any upstream ￿rm is bounded from above by ￿M.
But Uj can obtain a deviation pro￿t which is arbitrarily close to ￿M by o⁄ering the contract
(pM ￿ ";￿"=N2) to downstream ￿rms D2 to DN. For N large, the downstream price will
converge to pM ￿ ", and hence induce D1 to reject its equilibrium contract (as D1 just breaks
even when the market price is pM). D2 to DN will thus jointly produce (slightly more than)
the monopoly quantity and their joint rents converge to zero.
For ￿nite N, several issues arise. Firstly, the punishment e⁄ect of exclusive dealing will
be non-negligible, making collusion harder. Secondly, this may or may not be o⁄set by the
combined outlets/negative reaction e⁄ect, which jointly imply that the deviation pro￿t of Uj,
j 6= 1; may be strictly less than the monopoly pro￿t.
To see this, consider the polar case of two downstream ￿rms. We claim that Uj￿ s deviation
pro￿t is strictly less than ￿M. To obtain the monopoly pro￿t, Uj￿ s deviant o⁄er must induce
D1 to reject its equilibrium contract and D2 to produce the monopoly quantity. To achieve
the latter aim, the wholesale price o⁄ered to D2 must be 0, and to extract the monopoly
pro￿t, the ￿xed fee must approach ￿M. In the ensuing subgame, it is clearly an equilibrium
that D1 rejects its equilibrium contract and D2 accepts the deviant contract. However, it is
also an equilibrium for D1 to accept its equilibrium contract and for D2 to reject the deviant
31contract. Since we seek the most collusive subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, in the
subgame following Uj￿ s deviation, we must select the equilibrium that gives the lowest pro￿t
to the deviant Uj, i.e., in this case, the equilibrium where it is the ￿rm receiving the deviant
o⁄er that rejects its contract. It follows that it is impossible for Uj to obtain deviation pro￿ts
of ￿M in this case.30
The limit case as N ! 1 is particularly simple since the punishment e⁄ect goes to zero and
moreover the double-marginalization problem disappears. This makes it possible to extract all
downstream rents using linear tari⁄s, so that the downstream ￿rms accepting a deviant o⁄er
will never make losses independently of whether D1 rejects its contract. The multiplicity of
equilibria at the acceptance stage, which limits rent extraction in the above example, can thus
be costlessly avoided.
In summary, we have shown that the ￿rst vertical merger in an industry facilitates col-
lusion to a greater extent than does the ￿rst exclusive dealing contract, essentially because
of the bene￿cial reaction e⁄ect associated with the former. On the other hand, arms-length
relationships may have the advantage that any deviations are publicly observed, which is ad-
vantageous for collusion if there is at least one integrated ￿rm able to react. Thus it may be
that the optimal collusive arrangement involves some combination of vertical merger and ex-
clusive dealing arrangements. The complexities arising in the above example suggest, however,
that the analysis of such a combination will not be straightforward.31
6.2 Long-term Resale Price Maintenance
We can interpret resale price maintenance as an industry-wide downstream agreement that no
downstream ￿rm may sell his product at a price less than some recommended price, which
we will call pRPM. This will limit the opportunity for price-cutting by downstream ￿rms in
response to upstream deviations. However, a simple argument shows that in the absence of
other vertical restraints or vertical integration, resale price maintenance does nothing to facil-
itate upstream collusion (though it certainly limits downstream competition should upstream
collusion break down). The reason is that if there is no vertical integration or exclusive deal-
ing, upstream ￿rms can capture the whole downstream market by simply slightly undercutting
their rivals￿o⁄ers and there is no need for downstream price reductions (indeed, these are un-
desirable since these limit the downstream rents to be captured from deviation). It is perhaps
surprising that the only vertical restraint which is still treated as per se illegal in the United
States is in fact innocuous.32 We conjecture that resale price maintenance will have an impact
on collusion in the presence of other vertical restraints such as integration or exclusive dealing
(RPM limits the reaction e⁄ect and a⁄ects the size of both punishment and deviation pro￿ts),
30In fact, the most collusive equilibrium requires that Uj￿ s deviant o⁄er gives positive rents to D2 even if D1
were to accept its equilibrium contract, so that it is a dominant strategy for D2 to accept the deviant o⁄er. It
is possible to show that the optimal deviation gives Uj a rent of b ￿
C(0;w
￿
11), the Cournot pro￿t of a ￿rm with
zero marginal cost which faces a rival with marginal cost w
￿
11.
31For an analysis of the static case where a vertically integrated ￿rm can also o⁄er exclusive dealing contracts
to other downstream ￿rms, see Chen and Riordan (2003).
32Jullien and Rey (2000) present a model where RPM does have an impact, because shocks to downstream
￿rms are di¢ cult to observe.
32but we leave this analysis for future research.
6.3 Long-term Exclusive Territories
In our model of homogeneous upstream goods, we can interpret an exclusive territories agree-
ment among downstream ￿rms as an agreement to segment the market. Thus if total demand
is Q(p), then the N downstream ￿rms agree to divide the market such that each faces demand
curve 1
NQ(p), and they do not compete for customers, so the price charged by Di has no e⁄ect
on demand in the market served by Dj. As with resale price maintenance, this restraint has
no e⁄ect on upstream collusion as upstream ￿rms are still perfectly able to slightly undercut
one another and serve all downstream ￿rms, although it is once again true that there may be
complex e⁄ects arising from the interaction of exclusive territories and other vertical restraints.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis has highlighted four e⁄ects of vertical merger on upstream ￿rms￿ability to collude.
The outlets e⁄ect facilitates collusion. It occurs when the vertical merger of a downstream ￿rm
removes an outlet through which a cheating upstream ￿rm would otherwise wish to sell when it
deviates from collusion. The outlets e⁄ect therefore arises when an unintegrated upstream ￿rm
needs to deviate with several downstream ￿rms in order to obtain the maximum pro￿ts from
defection, and yet cannot make a pro￿table o⁄er to the integrated downstream ￿rm. Thus, for
example, it arises with Cournot competition and public o⁄ers, as well as with secret o⁄ers.
The reaction e⁄ect occurs when a vertical merger improves the ability of upstream ￿rms
to react to deviations by their rivals. Since a vertically integrated pair can collude with a
lower wholesale price than otherwise, integration can expedite punishment and thence facilitate
collusion. The reaction e⁄ect clearly arises when o⁄ers are public (or, presumably, have some
chance of becoming public).
The ￿ ip side of this relatively ￿￿ exible contracting￿between an integrated pair lies in the
lack-of-commitment e⁄ect. Recipients of an integrated ￿rm￿ s deviant o⁄ers anticipate that its
own downstream a¢ liate will be informed about such o⁄ers and will thus play best responses
to them. This e⁄ect can limit the deviation pro￿t available to an integrated ￿rm when o⁄ers
are secret, making collusion easier to sustain.
Acting against these three e⁄ects is the punishment e⁄ect, which arises in a Cournot setting
because the Nash reversion pro￿ts of an integrated ￿rm are larger than those of an unintegrated
upstream ￿rm. An integrated ￿rm therefore su⁄ers less from potential punishment and hence
is more inclined to cheat.
In the Bertrand and Cournot models with public and secret o⁄ers we have studied, the pun-
ishment e⁄ect was always o⁄set by either the outlets or reaction e⁄ect, so that vertical merger
always facilitated collusion. On the basis of our analysis, we suggest the following tentative
policy conclusion. Given a relatively concentrated upstream industry with barriers to entry,
so that collusive behavior is a serious possibility, vertical merger is more likely to be harmful
in facilitating collusion when: the downstream industry is less concentrated (higher N); and
more competitive (e.g. less di⁄erentiated, price not quantity setting) because the punishment
33e⁄ect will be smaller. This prescription is in contrast to the current conventional wisdom which
suggests that vertical merger is likely to be problematic only when the downstream industry
is already concentrated.33 We also considered the issue of identifying a disruptive buyer - one
whose presence particularly disrupts collusion, and with whom a vertical merger would partic-
ularly facilitate collusion. Intuitively, in two models of downstream heterogeneity, we showed
that the disruptive buyer is the larger or more e¢ cient buyer. This result is less straightfor-
ward than it appears since it depends on a balance of the various e⁄ects described above, and
in particular integration with a disruptive buyer will actually increase the integrated ￿rm￿ s
incentives to cut prices, other things being equal. Finally we investigated the extent to which
the use of other vertical restraints can substitute for vertical merger in facilitating collusion.
The complex interaction between vertical integration and other vertical restraints we leave as
a topic for future research.
8 Appendix
Proof of proposition 7. First step. We claim that the pooled incentive constraints under
vertical integration, (13) and (14), are slack (hold with strict inequality) if evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI



























If evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI
, the last inequality holds with equality. Hence, if evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI


















































33Vertical merger by an essential upstream facility into a concentrated downstream industry might nevertheless
be harmful for more standard, non-cooperative reasons relating to the potential foreclosure of other ￿rms, see,
e.g., Rey and Tirole (2003). These e⁄ects do not arise in our model, which allows us to better focus on the
impact of merger on collusion in a repeated game context.
34Since the industry pro￿t is higher under monopoly than under oligopoly, ￿M > M￿C(M), the
































which is clearly satis￿ed since r((M ￿ 1)QM=M) 6= QM=M.
Second step. The sum of the RHS of the pooled incentive constraints under vertical in-
tegration is decreasing in ￿ (since R(Q) is decreasing in Q), and so if the pooled incentive
constraints are slack if evaluated at ￿ = 1=M, they continue to be slack for any ￿ ￿ 1=M.
Third step. Comparing (12) and (14), we note that (14) is slack if evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI
and ￿ = 1=M. Hence, since the pooled incentive constraints under vertical integration are
(i) slack if evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI
and any ￿ ￿ 1=M, (ii) continuous in ￿, and (iii) since an
unintegrated upstream ￿rm￿ s incentive constraint, (14), is clearly violated at ￿ = 1, there must
exist a market share allocation ￿￿ 2 [1=M;1) such that all incentive constraints under vertical
integration are slack if evaluated at ￿ = b ￿
NI
and ￿ = ￿￿. Consequently, under market share
allocation ￿￿, the critical discount factor under vertical integration is strictly less than b ￿
NI
.
Secret O⁄ers with Symmetric Beliefs. While passive beliefs are most commonly used
in the literature on vertical restraints with secret contracts, other assumptions on beliefs have
been proposed. One particularly simple class of beliefs are ￿symmetric beliefs￿ , according to
which a downstream ￿rm receiving a deviant o⁄er believes that each of its downstream rivals
was o⁄ered the same contract; see McAfee and Schwartz (1994).34
In what follows, we re-examine the Bertrand and Cournot cases when unintegrated down-
stream ￿rms have symmetric beliefs: whenever an unintegrated downstream ￿rm receives
an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er, it believes that all other unintegrated downstream ￿rms have re-
ceived the same deviant o⁄er. However, since the industry is asymmetric when one upstream-
downstream pair is vertically integrated, we depart from the assumption of symmetric beliefs
in two respects. (1) When an unintegrated downstream ￿rm receives a deviant o⁄er from an
unintegrated upstream ￿rm, it believes that no deviant o⁄er has been made to the integrated
downstream ￿rm. (2) The integrated downstream ￿rm has passive beliefs: when it receives a
deviant o⁄er from an unintegrated upstream ￿rm, it believes that this was a ￿mistake￿ , and
no deviant o⁄ers have been made to the unintegrated downstream ￿rms. We believe these two
modi￿cations of symmetric beliefs to be reasonable. Most importantly, as we will show below,
34We do not consider wary beliefs, the other type of beliefs introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994). To
illustrate the problems that arise, consider the Cournot model. If we were to follow McAfee and Schwartz
in imposing wary beliefs on ￿rms￿response to both on- and o⁄-the-equilibrium path o⁄ers, then it would be
impossible for upstream ￿rms to extract the full monopoly rent in this model, no matter how large the discount
factor. If by contrast we were to impose such beliefs only on o⁄-the-equilibrium path o⁄ers, then for a su¢ ciently
large number of downstream ￿rms it would be possible to sustain the monopoly outcome for any value of the
discount factor in the unintegrated case (even in the static game).
35the most collusive equilibrium given these restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs is such that,
conditional on deviating, an upstream ￿rm￿ s optimal deviation can always be made in such a
way that is consistent with these beliefs. In particular, whenever an upstream ￿rm wants to
deviate it can do so optimally by o⁄ering the same contract to all unintegrated downstream
￿rms. Furthermore, whenever an unintegrated upstream ￿rm wants to deviate, it should do
so optimally by deviating only through the unintegrated downstream ￿rms. Hence, no down-
stream ￿rm will ex post regret accepting an upstream ￿rm￿ s optimal deviation contract, which
implies that an upstream ￿rm￿ s deviation pro￿t is bounded from above by the monopoly pro￿t.
Bertrand Competition Downstream. We ￿rst analyze the case of price competition down-
stream. The collusive and noncollusive equilibrium contracts are as under passive beliefs, that
is (pM;0) and (0;0), respectively. Consider the case where no ￿rm is vertically integrated.
Since any downstream ￿rm receiving an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er believes (correctly or not) that
each of its downstream rivals has received the same o⁄er, we need to specify what equilib-
rium prescribes if an upstream ￿rm were to o⁄er (w;F) to all downstream ￿rms. (i) Assume
F < 0. Then, equilibrium is such that all downstream ￿rms will accept this o⁄er and price
at w in the downstream market, provided w < pM. (Having passive beliefs, a downstream
￿rm that receives the o⁄er (w;F) believes (correctly or not) that all other downstream ￿rms
have received the same o⁄er, and that all other downstream ￿rms will therefore price at w.
Therefore, the downstream ￿rm should accept the o⁄er and price at w as well.) (ii) Assume
F ￿ 0. If w < pM and 0 < F < ￿M, there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium. To
see this, note that if two or more ￿rms were to accept this o⁄er with probability 1, then they
would price at w in the retail market. But then, a downstream ￿rm could pro￿tably deviate
by not accepting the o⁄er. However, if only one ￿rm were to accept this o⁄er, then this ￿rm
would price just below pM in the retail market. But then another downstream ￿rm has a
pro￿table deviation: accept the o⁄er as well and undercut the other ￿rm in the retail market
(since acceptance decisions, like o⁄ers, are secret). Therefore, let us consider the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium, where each downstream ￿rm accepts the o⁄er with probability ￿.
Not knowing how many other ￿rms have accepted the o⁄er (but believing ￿correctly or not
￿that all other downstream ￿rms have received the same o⁄er), each downstream ￿rm will
then randomize at the output stage. Since ￿miscoordination￿(two downstream ￿rms or more
accepting this contract) reduces downstream ￿rms￿pro￿ts, a deviant upstream ￿rm can obtain
less than the monopoly pro￿t in total by o⁄ering contracts with positive ￿xed fees. Hence,
the optimal deviation for an upstream ￿rm consists in o⁄ering (pM ￿ ";￿") to each of the N
downstream ￿rms. Each downstream ￿rm will accept this contract and then price at pM ￿ ".
In this way, the deviant upstream ￿rm obtains (arbitrarily close to) the monopoly pro￿t. The
critical discount factor under non-integration is thus (M ￿ 1)=M.
Suppose now that one upstream-downstream pair (U1￿D1, say) is vertically integrated. By
the same argument as under non-integration, no upstream ￿rm can get more than the monopoly
pro￿t by deviating. The integrated ￿rm can get the monopoly pro￿t by simply undercutting
its downstream rivals in the retail market. There is no punishment e⁄ect since noncollusive
pro￿ts are zero. Consider now the incentives to deviate for an unintegrated upstream ￿rm, say
Dj. As under non-integration, the deviant Dj can receive (close to) the monopoly pro￿t by
o⁄ering (pM ￿";￿") to all unintegrated downstream ￿rms. Hence, the critical discount factor
36under vertical integration is (M ￿ 1)=M. Since there is no reaction or outlets e⁄ect, vertical
integration has no e⁄ect upon upstream ￿rms￿ability to collude when beliefs are symmetric
and downstream ￿rms produce homogeneous goods and compete in prices.
Cournot Competition Downstream. We now turn to the case of quantity competition down-
stream. The collusive and noncollusive equilibrium contracts are as under passive beliefs.
Consider ￿rst the case of non-integration. As discussed for the Bertrand case, we need to spec-
ify what equilibrium prescribes if a deviant upstream ￿rm were to o⁄er (w;F) to each of the N
downstream ￿rms. Let ￿(wjn) denote the gross pro￿t a downstream ￿rm can make if it accepts
the contract along with n ￿ 1 downstream rivals, and let q(wjn) denote the associated output
of the ￿rm. Since q(wjn) < q(wjn ￿ 1) and a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is decreasing in the joint output
of its rivals, there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium at the acceptance stage. No ￿rm
accepts the deviant o⁄er if ￿(wj1) ￿ F, only DN accepts the o⁄er if ￿(wj2) ￿ F < ￿(wj1),
only DN and D(N ￿ 1) accept the o⁄er if ￿(wj3) ￿ F < ￿(wj2), and so on. Therefore, an
upstream ￿rm￿ s deviation pro￿t is bounded from above by the monopoly pro￿t, even if it were
to o⁄er di⁄erent contracts to di⁄erent downstream ￿rms. A deviant upstream ￿rm can obtain
the monopoly pro￿t by slightly lowering the ￿xed fee, while keeping the wholesale prices at





P0(QM);￿M=N2 ￿ "), where " is arbitrarily small.
Consider now the case where one upstream-downstream pair (U1 ￿ D1, say) is vertically
integrated. As in the case of passive beliefs, the integrated upstream ￿rm can get the monopoly
pro￿t in the period of deviation by ￿signaling￿its intention to deviate to the unintegrated down-
stream ￿rms (who will then reject their equilibrium contracts) and then selling the monopoly
quantity through its own downstream a¢ liate, D1. In the punishment phase, the integrated
￿rm gets ￿C(N) in each period. Because of the outlets e⁄ect, an unintegrated upstream ￿rm
can only get the Cournot best-reply pro￿t to the integrated ￿rm￿ s equilibrium output, R(￿QM),
which can be accomplished by o⁄ering the same contract to all unintegrated downstream ￿rms
(but not to the integrated D1), vindicating their beliefs.35
Hence, under Cournot competition, vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion if
￿C(N) + R(￿QM) < ￿M, where ￿ is the optimal market share arrangement. It follows im-
mediately that if the number N of downstream ￿rms is su¢ ciently large, then this inequality
must hold. In fact, it is possible to show that vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion
for any number of upstream and downstream ￿rms, M ￿ N, if demand is linear.
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